What is truth? Recently in the comment sections of this blog it was put to me that truth is a function of language. This may well be right, I suspect that it is. On the other hand this might just put the problem of the nature of truth at one extra remove, since we can say truth is a function of language and then ask: what is language a function of?
If the correspondence theory of truth is mired in circularity because we have to use language itself to describe what the truth of a proposition could correspond to, what is the alternative?
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- Psiomniac
- I'm a guitar player and tutor with a debilitating interest in philosophy.
64 comments:
"what is language a function of?"
Language is only a behaviour.
(March 15 2007. 23:51.)
You say 'only' but language is not like other behaviours. It is a bit special. If you don't believe me, look at humanity compared with all the other species on earth. So, I wonder, what is the language behavior a function of?
"You say 'only' but language is not like other behaviours. It is a bit special. If you don't believe me, look at humanity compared with all the other species on earth."
Language is an interesting behaviour, yes, but it is not restricted to humans. Eusocial insects have been using language far more successfully than ourselves for a lot longer. Bacteria have been talking with one another forever. What is so implicitly special about the uses to which humans put language? Are we getting into quantum fairy-dust territory here?
Our use of language appears special relative to the other behaviours of our body only because it's the one to which we pay most attention. Ask yourself, though, which of our other behaviours we could abandon without damaging or abandoning our ability to use language. What are you aware of your body doing right now that, if it ceased, you could yet continue to think and to type? May you stop up your lungs and continue to talk here? Shall your heart cease its beat that you may listen more closely to your thoughts? Will you hit the keys on the keyboard without using your muscles?
"So, I wonder, what is the language behavior a function of?"
The same as every other behaviour; the body.
(16th March 2007. 10:04.)
Language is an interesting behaviour, yes, but it is not restricted to humans. Eusocial insects have been using language far more successfully than ourselves for a lot longer.
Interesting. I wonder if you could give a description of the grammar of the language used by eusocial insects or indeed bacteria?
What are you aware of your body doing right now that, if it ceased, you could yet continue to think and to type?
Fidgeting with my right foot.
Will you hit the keys on the keyboard without using your muscles?
No, but a monkey can hit the keyboard, I can write things that are intelligible to people (sometimes). There is a difference. Necessary and sufficient condition distinction I reckon.
The same as every other behaviour; the body.
Actually I am happy with that, I totally agree.
Psio,
Your approach to blogging by asking questions seems to me a very useful service, and refreshing by contrast with the many blogs devoted to making assertions in a polemical tone. Your questions in your last post, on faith and reason, elicited responses from a Christian perspective, a Baha'i perspective, and a playful philosophical perspective. This diversity of insights shed light on the subject for me. It illustrates the potential of the internet to be a kind of meta-university where the thoughts of people from around the globe, holding to widely varying philosophies, can be brought to bear on a subject. It is yet another sign of the emerging oneness of humankind, so highly valued by Baha'is. The investigation of truth is becoming more and more of a shared enterprise that we can all partake in. And what better starting point for investigating truth, than asking questions.
It so happens that I recently borrowed from the public library, a book by Simon Blackburn, "Truth: a Guide for the Perplexed". I'm only half way through it, so its too soon to offer any conclusions from my reading of it. However, it appears to be a very good survey of the problem of truth in philosophy, from the ancient Greeks down to the present day. Perhaps you have already read it. Simon Blackburn is professor of philosophy at Cambridge. It also seems worth repeating my previous recommendation of William Hatcher's book "Minimalism", which is available online. His discussion of the questions you are raising about truth and language, etc., is exceptionally clear and vigorous. As a sample, here are his introductory remarks under the sub-heading, "Knowledge and Reality, Subjectivity and Objectivity":
"One of the most contentious issues in the history of philosophy has been the question of the extent to which it is possible for us to have objective knowledge of reality. By objective knowledge, we mean a knowledge that is invariant under changes of point of view. The question itself already involves several assumptions: (1) there does exist a mind-independent (objective) reality whose intrinsic features or qualities are independent of the mental states of the knower; (2) it is in principle possible to apprehend these objective qualities, if not wholly and perfectly, at least to a significant degree; (3) it is possible to formulate or articulate this understanding in a manner that allows us to communicate it to others and to validate the independency (or invariance) of this understanding under certain changes of point of view (which we will call transformations)."
Analysis of human ability to know and discuss truth concerning any outward object indicates that a theory of truth needs to deal with these aspects:
* The object that is known.
* Transmission of data from the object to the human senses.
* Interpretation of the data by the mind, which creates from it a mental map of the object.
* Formulation of that mental map in words (or pictures etc.).
* Conveying those words or pictures to others through speech, writing, drawing, or other arts.
* Conversion of the words, etc., by the hearer, into his/her own mental map.
Obviously, mistakes can be made, and are often made, anywhere along the chain. Its a complex business.
My contribution then, at this point, is that truth needs to be pursued by its lovers, with great patience and mutual tolerance for one another!
John
"Interesting. I wonder if you could give a description of the grammar of the language used by eusocial insects"
Certainly. Leptogenys distinguenda qualifies its trail-following chemical with a second which advises a colony of the difference between a raid and an emigration. As for bacteria, quorum sensing is very interesting.
"Fidgeting with my right foot."
You would not regard your fidgeting so special as language? Why is language special and fidgeting not?
"No, but a monkey can hit the keyboard"
Not without the aid of its muscles.
"I can write things that are intelligible to people"
Why is that special?
"Actually I am happy with that, I totally agree."
Then truth is a behaviour of the body, as with any use of lanugage.
(17th March 2007. 12:10.
John,
Thanks for your kind words, they are appreciated.
I have two of Blackburn's books, 'Being Good' and 'Think'. I liked those so I might well check out the the one you mention. The extract from 'Minimilism' is good too so I might have to add it to my ever lengthening reading list.
RR,
Certainly. Leptogenys distinguenda qualifies its trail-following chemical with a second which advises a colony of the difference between a raid and an emigration. As for bacteria, quorum sensing is very interesting.
This is not a grammar.
Monkeys can fidget and use muscles, so can I. I can type words that form grammatically legal sentences that I have never heard or seen before. If I see that as special and you don't then I have no problem with that.
Then truth is a behaviour of the body, as with any use of lanugage.
I am not convinced that all the salient features of truth have been captured by this description.
"This is not a grammar."
It's a rule governing the meaning of a message. There is no more to grammar.
"Monkeys can fidget and use muscles, so can I."
I did not say that either you or monkeys are unable to fidget or use muscles. I think you have lost the thread of the conversation for a moment.
"I can type words that form grammatically legal sentences that I have never heard or seen before. If I see that as special and you don't then I have no problem with that."
What are your criteria for regarding this as special?
"I am not convinced that all the salient features of truth have been captured by this description."
Please, indicate a truth to me without the use of your body. Where is the truth that was never told?
I fear you regard truth as Platonic but perhaps I am mistaken. In your introduction to this topic you seem to favour the idea that truth is a function of language. Upon what grounds?
(19th March,2007, 11:27.)
It's a rule governing the meaning of a message. There is no more to grammar.
I think there is.
I did not say that either you or monkeys are unable to fidget or use muscles. I think you have lost the thread of the conversation for a moment.
You have missed the point. In terms of what is likely to be regarded as 'special' use of muscles is very common in the animal kingdom. Use of language is not.
What are your criteria for regarding this as special?
Let's start with rare in terms of possesed by few species and yet spectacularly suited to cooperation and the manipulation of our environment.
Please, indicate a truth to me without the use of your body. Where is the truth that was never told?
Are you in danger of confusing the message and the meduim?
I fear you regard truth as Platonic but perhaps I am mistaken. In your introduction to this topic you seem to favour the idea that truth is a function of language. Upon what grounds?
Platonic Ideals have never convinced me. I think we must use language to talk about truth. There is an inherent difficulty in this.
"I think there is."
Why?
"You have missed the point. In terms of what is likely to be regarded as 'special' use of muscles is very common in the animal kingdom."
"Special"? Qualify, please.
"Use of language is not."
Would you concede that animals are able to convey meanings to one another?
"Let's start with rare in terms of possesed by few species and yet spectacularly suited to cooperation and the manipulation of our environment."
The animal kingdom is littered with examples of cooperation, even between species. Certainly nonhuman animals have been manipulating their environment for far longer than humans.
So, you started with rare; to where shall you move along?
"Are you in danger of confusing the message and the meduim?"
Was there ever a message without a medium? The message is the medium. You cannot communicate a message without signs.
"Platonic Ideals have never convinced me. I think we must use language to talk about truth. There is an inherent difficulty in this."
Yes, when truth is mistaken for a thing independent of language. Truth is only a function of language.
(20th March, 2007. 07:56.)
Why do I think that there is more to grammar than 'a rule governing the meaning of a message?' Well I think this is because of the meaning of the word 'grammar' as normally understood. A generative grammar is usually a set of rules capable of generating an infinite set of legal strings. In the Leptogenys distinguenda case there seem to be only two possible legal strings: 'a' and 'ab'. Is this, then a grammar? If you like. If you want to specify your minimal conditions for grammar then I will specify a subset which only humans (as far as we know) possess.
"Special"? Qualify, please.
I would argue that a fully fledged language requires a non trivial grammar. Language in this form is very rare and has a profound effect (or cause) on the kind of consciousness you can have. The way we have cooperated with each other and manipulated the environment is spectacular in comparisn with anything animals have done and would have been impossible without things like the future tense, the subjunctive and other constructs of human language.
Would you concede that animals are able to convey meanings to one another?
I would.
Was there ever a message without a medium?
No.
The message is the medium.
In a sense, yes but also 'message' refers to a phenomenon which is not captured at the level of description involved in describing the medium itself. None of the descriptions of compression waves in the concert hall will capture the symphony.
You cannot communicate a message without signs.
True.
Yes, when truth is mistaken for a thing independent of language. Truth is only a function of language.
A am convinced that truth cannot be independent of language. I am not convinced that truth is only a function of language.
"A generative grammar is usually a set of rules capable of generating an infinite set of legal strings. In the Leptogenys distinguenda case there seem to be only two possible legal strings: 'a' and 'ab'. Is this, then a grammar?"
Certainly. It's likely more complicated than it appears. Most things are at that level. Let us not be anthropocentric.
"If you want to specify your minimal conditions for grammar then I will specify a subset which only humans (as far as we know) possess."
In your terms, there are likely no such humans. All languages are finite and while there are many legal things which can be said many of them are no more than noise, devoid of application.
"I would argue that a fully fledged language requires a non trivial grammar."
It's a lovely adjective, non-trivial, but I cannot think of any grammar which I would describe as trivial. If a rule serves a purpose then it is not trivial. Scale is not a reliable indicator of significance.
"Language in this form is very rare and has a profound effect (or cause) on the kind of consciousness you can have."
So rare I cannot think of one. And did you have to use the 'C' word? So here we are deep in quantum fairy-dust territory. In what way does language cause consciousness? May we regard newborn children as conscious?
"The way we have cooperated with each other and manipulated the environment is spectacular in comparisn with anything animals have done"
Non-human animals changed the atmosphere of this world, and maintain it. Non-human animals made, and continue to make, the soil of this world. What have humans done that is so spectacular?
"impossible without things like the future tense, the subjunctive and other constructs of human language."
You could offer examples if you chose but I do not see the point. NHA may build beautiful and useful things without recourse to any of these.
"I would."
Then NHA have language.
"No."
Then meaning is not independent of language.
"In a sense, yes but also 'message' refers to a phenomenon which is not captured at the level of description involved in describing the medium itself."
That is one of those legal strings you were speaking of earlier. Perfect articulation but no communicated sense. You are simply saying that 'message' is noumenal, which is to quit the field.
"None of the descriptions of compression waves in the concert hall will capture the symphony."
Then you must accept that talk of "generative grammar" and "infinite set of legal strings" does not capture language. It's fair to say that the description of a thing is not that thing but that is something upon which we both already agree. What is important is the recognition that anything which might be regarded as truth is simply an articulation of language, a representation. There is no truth outside of language. Truth is a function of language.
"True."
Then messages are signs.
"A am convinced that truth cannot be independent of language. I am not convinced that truth is only a function of language."
You cannot or will not provide an alternative. My analysis of your position is that Truth is out there, it seems, in the ether. It is something which we may talk about, yes, as we might talk about velocity and motion, but less real; nothing more than an artefact of language, a God to which people may appeal .
(22 March, 2007. 09:41.)
Certainly. It's likely more complicated than it appears. Most things are at that level. Let us not be anthropocentric
How so?
In your terms, there are likely no such humans. All languages are finite and while there are many legal things which can be said many of them are no more than noise, devoid of application.
Like I said, you specify and so will I. Otherwise you are just making noise.
It's a lovely adjective, non-trivial, but I cannot think of any grammar which I would describe as trivial. If a rule serves a purpose then it is not trivial. Scale is not a reliable indicator of significance.
More noise.
Specify the minimal conditions for something to qualify as a grammar. I will then tell you what human grammar has that your specification lacks. It is not a matter of scale but complexity.
As for causality being to do with quantum fairy dust, well maybe you had a pint or too in The Bull as well. If you want to say that animals do things that are just as impressive as anything humans do then fine, that is your choice.
That is one of those legal strings you were speaking of earlier. Perfect articulation but no communicated sense. You are simply saying that 'message' is noumenal, which is to quit the field.
I can explain it with a simpler string if you are having difficulty. There is nothing noumenal about it. The message is the medium. I agree. There are different levels of describing things. Some will reveal the message. A subatomic description of a map would not be best for this purpose.
What is important is the recognition that anything which might be regarded as truth is simply an articulation of language, a representation. There is no truth outside of language. Truth is a function of language.
Truth is a function of language yes. I have a hunch that language is a function of bodies and that bodies are part of the phenomenal world.
You cannot or will not provide an alternative. My analysis of your position is that Truth is out there, it seems, in the ether. It is something which we may talk about, yes, as we might talk about velocity and motion, but less real; nothing more than an artefact of language, a God to which people may appeal .
On the contrary, I don't think there would be language without the phenomenal world.
"How so?"
It's probably a good idea not to assume that human language is the gold standard.
"Like I said, you specify and so will I. Otherwise you are just making noise."
Already have done. It's a rule governing the meaning of a message. There is no more to grammar.
"It is not a matter of scale but complexity."
Complexity, if you prefer, is not a reliable indicator of significance.
"As for causality being to do with quantum fairy dust, well maybe you had a pint or too in The Bull as well."
No, I'm talking about the other "C" word; consciousness, and language as its cause. How does that work then?
"If you want to say that animals do things that are just as impressive as anything humans do then fine, that is your choice."
More impressive, I would say.
"I can explain it with a simpler string if you are having difficulty. There is nothing noumenal about it."
You must be speaking of something noumenal, as neither you nor I seem to know what it is that must be added to the account in order to satisfy you. You refer to a "phenomenon" here and elsewhere to something beyond an account with which you agree, but go no further. This thing of which you speak must be ineffable as you admit that you feel it is beyond description. Of course, it isn't, but saying that grammar is not meaning is no more insightful than saying a pile of bricks is not a house. There is no problem here.
"Truth is a function of language yes. I have a hunch that language is a function of bodies and that bodies are part of the phenomenal world."
Language is a function of the body, then, as I said earlier. So language is phenomenal, although elsewhere you have said that in speaking of language you are not speaking of anything in the world.
"On the contrary, I don't think there would be language without the phenomenal world."
Here we are then. Language is a behaviour. Truth and morality are both functions of language and so behaviours also. The uses to which language are put are more significant than its origin.
(23rd March, 2007. 17:57.)
It's probably a good idea not to assume that human language is the gold standard.
I don't so much assume it as define it.
Already have done. It's a rule governing the meaning of a message. There is no more to grammar.
In that case, first I specify a set of rules capable of generating an infinite number of legal strings. That knocks out Leptogenys distinguenda. I think I'll throw in the capacity to handle counterfactuals, the subjunctive, future and past tenses. Name some animals that have such a grammar.
Complexity, if you prefer, is not a reliable indicator of significance.
Like any other indicator, it has its uses. Tell me, what do you think is a reliable indicator of significance?
No, I'm talking about the other "C" word; consciousness, and language as its cause. How does that work then?
Oh, that 'C' word! That's another thread. I don't believe in any quantum fairy dust I assure you.
More impressive, I would say.
Fine, say it to your heart's content.
You must be speaking of something noumenal, as neither you nor I seem to know what it is that must be added to the account in order to satisfy you. You refer to a "phenomenon" here and elsewhere to something beyond an account with which you agree, but go no further. This thing of which you speak must be ineffable as you admit that you feel it is beyond description. Of course, it isn't, but saying that grammar is not meaning is no more insightful than saying a pile of bricks is not a house. There is no problem here.
Fine, the message is the medium, the house is a pile of bricks. I'm not talking of the noumenal or the ineffable, just levels of describing phenomena. As you say, there is no problem here.
Language is a function of the body, then, as I said earlier. So language is phenomenal, although elsewhere you have said that in speaking of language you are not speaking of anything in the world
There are different ways of 'being in the world'. What do you think about the ontological status of the ellipse? I don't think it is a Form. I think it is a human construct. An abstraction. In a sense it exists. In a sense there are just bodies who behave in ways that involve drawing approximate flattened circles and squiggling or typing symbols.
Here we are then. Language is a behaviour. Truth and morality are both functions of language and so behaviours also. The uses to which language are put are more significant than its origin.
I think I agree with that.
"I don't so much assume it as define it."
That's fine while the only languages studied are human.
"In that case, first I specify a set of rules capable of generating an infinite number of legal strings."
Infinite, you say? You may specify it but can you demonstrate it?
"Tell me, what do you think is a reliable indicator of significance?"
Utility.
"Oh, that 'C' word! That's another thread. I don't believe in any quantum fairy dust I assure you."
I wondered. You have alluded to mystery phenomena frequently.
"Fine, say it to your heart's content."
Atmosphere. Soil.
"Fine, the message is the medium, the house is a pile of bricks."
The message is the medium. A house is not a pile of bricks.
"I'm not talking of the noumenal or the ineffable, just levels of describing phenomena."
Then, no mystery means by which we appreciate meaning.
"There are different ways of 'being in the world'. What do you think about the ontological status of the ellipse? I don't think it is a Form."
I do not hold with Forms but I feel that an ellipse exists in the same way that a cube exists and a sphere exists and a tree exists and a sea shell exists. An ellipse exists as a form without reference to any single Form. I am very fond of Platonic Idealism and the way it has been transmitted and translated down to us but I do not think that it is the case.
"In a sense there are just bodies who behave in ways that involve drawing approximate flattened circles and squiggling or typing symbols."
I rather enjoy thinking about motion as a feature of a block universe.
"I think I agree with that."
Does your current position, then, help you approach other issues of concern?
(24th March, 2007. 10:06.)
That's fine while the only languages studied are human.
So far so good then.
Infinite, you say? You may specify it but can you demonstrate it?
Well, it is easy to specify a grammar capable in principle of generating an infinite number of legal strings. Obviously if you specify a generation method and a time limit then the story is different.
Utility.
Seems fair. My purposes are varied in nature.
The message is the medium. A house is not a pile of bricks.
The message is the medium? The house is a pile of bricks. Piled in a certain way, with some mortar to keep it that way, with some timber, glass, fixtures and fittings. A family lives there.
These are electromagnetic waves. You can detect them with a number of different devices. You can track their fluctuations using this meter which gives a read out of fluctuations in electric and magnetic potential in space. What do you mean where is the message? If the message is the medium, there it is-the electromagnetic waves. Oh, you want to understand the message. For that you will need a radio receiver. It will convert the message from one medium to another, namely compression waves in air. Here, have this pressure meter and see if you can detect the first noun in the second sentence of the message with it.
Then, no mystery means by which we appreciate meaning.
I don't know exactly how meaning is achieved or appreciated. I think it rests on an ability to form and comprehend analogy. I also suspect an inescapable circularity in that explanation. I don't see it as essentially mysterious though, no.
I'm not convinced that no distinction can be made between the ontological status of ellipses and shells.
I rather enjoy thinking about motion as a feature of a block universe.
would motion in a block universe be like topology?
Does your current position, then, help you approach other issues of concern?
I do my best.
While we are on the subject of language, did you notice the contradiction in the post to which Self Evidently Flawed directed you?
"You don't actually need any language at all, let alone a whole sentence, in order to be an atheist. You merely need the sentence in order to tell someone else that you are an atheist...
http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/mbreligion/F2213237?thread=4113276&skip=60#p48230906"
I don't think 'contradiction' even begins to encompass the absurdity of the view expressed by SEF. She has a peremptory style indicative of a savant.
"She has a peremptory style indicative of a savant."
You are being generous. I've eaten carrots which were more savvy. I might have characterised it as precocity once but there are stunning chasms in her knowledge. Well, apparently stunning. She appears to possesses a little declarative knowledge, which impresses those with less, yes, but this is an illusion; she merely hoards and flings data, with no real understanding of their implication or provenance. She lacks the procedural knowledge neessary to use any of this data, and I am put in mind of a child with an encyclopedia, although I would be surprised if she has read a book since she first logged onto the internet.
She is not particularly unusual in her shallowness, of course, only a little more eloquent with it than most. Witness the discussions recently begun by U1847971, a self-identified pagan who spurns gods and regards orthodoxy as redundant to good religion, rather relying upon "orthopraxy", which is to say dress-up and role-play. This person has recently been born again into Dawkins and clearly believes that having read TGD >ack< >spit< he is now a fully paid up member of the scientific community and a logical positivist to boot, yet although he appeals to rationality by way of Dawkins' partial polemic his understanding is betrayed by his composition. He is a laugh-riot and puts me in mind of Count Arthur Strong:
www.komediaentertainment.com/count_arthur_strong/
It is my view that someone who is persuaded so easily against his religion never had a religion. So far, of course, his scorn is reserved for the Big Three, and I think it is likely to remain that way despite his acquaintances who believe that they receive regular visits and advice from people who just happen to be gods.
The internet seems full of people like these two, who confuse data with knowledge. I meet few in real life, thankfully.
"Obviously if you specify a generation method and a time limit then the story is different."
You would not specify a natural language, then.
"Seems fair. My purposes are varied in nature."
Isn't it the case that any formal language used by an Anglophone is an extension of English?
"The message is the medium? The house is a pile of bricks. Piled in a certain way"
It is the "certain way" which is the message and the medium. The medium is not brick.
"If the message is the medium, there it is-the electromagnetic waves. Oh, you want to understand the message. For that you will need a radio receiver."
Please. If an extraterrestrial species were to hear a broadcast from our world of "Ba Ba Black Sheep" do you think their first thoughts would be to the agricultural traditions of its authors?
"I don't know exactly how meaning is achieved or appreciated. I think it rests on an ability to form and comprehend analogy. I also suspect an inescapable circularity in that explanation."
Circularity is not a problem. We may appreciate the beauty of a sea shell without being concerned for the atomic structure of calcium.
"I don't see it as essentially mysterious though, no."
Nor I, although interesting to think about.
"I'm not convinced that no distinction can be made between the ontological status of ellipses and shells."
I disagree. Both are vectors.
"would motion in a block universe be like topology?"
I think it is. I'm perdurantist.
I listened to Count Arthur Strong in its daytime slot and did giggle I admit.
It is my view that someone who is persuaded so easily against his religion never had a religion.
Perhaps we should do an experiment and get him to read the McGrath book and see if he then renounces Dawkins.
You would not specify a natural language, then.
No, that's even more fiddly than formal languages and even further removed from the feats of eusocial insects.
Isn't it the case that any formal language used by an Anglophone is an extension of English?
In what respect?
It is the "certain way" which is the message and the medium. The medium is not brick.
Well that collapses the meaning of 'medium'. I'd rather like to keep it thanks.
Please. If an extraterrestrial species were to hear a broadcast from our world of "Ba Ba Black Sheep" do you think their first thoughts would be to the agricultural traditions of its authors?
No but they would in principle be able to distinguish a message from static although both would be conveyed to them via the medium of radio waves.
I disagree. Both are vectors.
How so? I would have thought you could make a case for them being loci but vectors?
I think it is. I'm perdurantist.
That's something you don't see every day. Worm theorist or stage theorist?
I always thought the 'closest known follower' idea could cope with problems of identity, still what do I know?
"Perhaps we should do an experiment and get him to read the McGrath book and see if he then renounces Dawkins."
Oh, he claims to have read it:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/mbreligion/F2213239?thread=4094510&skip=0&show=20#p48131583
McGrath, it seems, is an aid to personal hygiene while Dawkins is quite happy for people to walk around with mucky bums. Certainly the majority of Dawkinites talk crap.
"No, that's even more fiddly than formal languages and even further removed from the feats of eusocial insects."
Isn't the superior language that which is both effective and economic? Eusocial insects are by far and away more successful than mammals.
"In what respect?"
That formal languages may not stand alone.
"Well that collapses the meaning of 'medium'."
Only in a very superficial manner.
"No but they would in principle be able to distinguish a message from static although both would be conveyed to them via the medium of radio waves."
But what would be their first thoughts upon discerning a message conveyed by radio?
"How so? I would have thought you could make a case for them being loci but vectors?"
A locus is only a space. A vector is something which happens in space.
"That's something you don't see every day. Worm theorist or stage theorist?"
Worm. Yourself?
"I always thought the 'closest known follower' idea could cope with problems of identity, still what do I know?"
Does identity reside in a space or in the substance which occupies that space?
Well, I have taken the perhaps perverse route of having read the McGrath book but not the Dawkins one.
Isn't the superior language that which is both effective and economic? Eusocial insects are by far and away more successful than mammals.
But as a mammal I can debate the criteria for success. You won't catch insects doing that. Mind you, perhaps that's because they are busy taking over the world...
That formal languages may not stand alone.
Well, what if the future is inhabited by quantum computer/positronic brained robots that just speak to each other in Panlog?
Only in a very superficial manner.
Well, I could take your word for that but...I just have this feeling of non-specific unease about it.
But what would be their first thoughts upon discerning a message conveyed by radio?
Seek and destroy.
A locus is only a space. A vector is something which happens in space.
I would have said a locus is the trace of a path potentially travelled whereas a vector is an amount in a given direction. Oh, I did!
Worm. Yourself?
I'll wait for the maths to work out so that you can buy devices based on one of these models of reality in Currys.
Does identity reside in a space or in the substance which occupies that space?
Is there such a sharp distinction?
"Well, I have taken the perhaps perverse route of having read the McGrath book but not the Dawkins one."
I honestly doubt that it is necessary. I am sure that we have both encountered his recitation of his arguments often enough to be familiar with them. Still, I undertstand that there are several pdf copies of TGD >hack< online.
I have not read McGrath's correction but I expect that its contents are echoed in this talk:
http://www.bethinking.org/resource.php?ID=176
Honestly, after hearing Dawkins' prattle go unchallenged for so long, in several areas, this talk is like cello music.
"But as a mammal I can debate the criteria for success. You won't catch insects doing that. Mind you, perhaps that's because they are busy taking over the world..."
That's the thing. The point of language isn't the discussion on language.
I am sure that there are several kinds of organism which rule the world at various levels, and have ruled. It seems that the larger you are the faster your reign is over.
"Well, what if the future is inhabited by quantum computer/positronic brained robots that just speak to each other in Panlog?"
If these things are to be intelligent then Panlog will only be the basis for a subsequent natural language.
"Well, I could take your word for that but...I just have this feeling of non-specific unease about it."
Is it a particular feeling of non-specific unease or a vague feeling of non-specific unease? Do you get this a lot or only when you read my arguments?
"Seek and destroy."
I have always thought that Berserkers were a good idea:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berserker_probe#Berserkers
Anyway, I suspect the first thought of an extraterrestrial species to the receipt of a broadcast nursery rhyme would be to the transmission of that rhyme, the enabling technology, and not to the sense of it. SETI is not looking for nursery rhymes but evidence of civilisations capable of making radio broadcasts.
"I would have said a locus is the trace of a path potentially travelled"
That's a space, I would say, but I disagree with the implication that loci are a posteriori to vectors.
"I'll wait for the maths to work out so that you can buy devices based on one of these models of reality in Currys."
I'm sure there'll be a toaster with added string theory along any day now. Meanwhile, perdurantism is so much more intuitively sensible than the alternative. Treating people, or anything, as a series begs a multiplicity of Creations. What is the interval between each instance of you? You're in Zenoland.
"Is there such a sharp distinction?"
If you stand by your argument in Philochristos then yes. I don't.
That's the thing. The point of language isn't the discussion on language.
I don't think imposing arbitrary boundaries on the point of language really works. It is a discussing kind of thing. It isn't for us to delimit what it should talk about.
Is it a particular feeling of non-specific unease or a vague feeling of non-specific unease? Do you get this a lot or only when you read my arguments?
Are you asking if it is a specific non-specific feeling of unease? Oh dear I have a vague inkling now. Introspection time for me.
I have always thought that Berserkers were a good idea:
If there were a button labelled 'do not press: quantum cascade device liable to collapse the entire universe into a singularity' would you be tempted?
That's a space, I would say, but I disagree with the implication that loci are a posteriori to vectors.
I suppose you are right but vectors are a posteriori to 'space' as opposed to 'a space' I would have thought. For vectors you need dimensions, and dimensions posit space.
Treating people, or anything, as a series begs a multiplicity of Creations. What is the interval between each instance of you? You're in Zenoland.
I remember trying to make sense of 'Being and Nothingness' as a teenager. 'Noumenal' wasn't even in the glossary. The preface gave an account of advances in philosophy that relied on this series treatment. Meanwhile I reckon the sum of an infinite series goes a long way to solve some of Zeno's puzzlers.
If you stand by your argument in Philochristos then yes. I don't.
I wonder which one you mean because I don't think that there is a sharp distinction myself.
"I don't think imposing arbitrary boundaries on the point of language really works."
I'm not. Language did not evolve that it might describe itself.
"Oh dear I have a vague inkling now."
Lewis?
"If there were a button labelled 'do not press: quantum cascade device liable to collapse the entire universe into a singularity' would you be tempted?"
Oh my, yes. But only if I could redecorate afterwards. Don't you think Berserkers are a good idea for a budding galactic hegemony? I'm not saying it's a kind idea, but then it is possible to appreciate ideas without following them through, isn't it?
"I suppose you are right but vectors are a posteriori to 'space' as opposed to 'a space' I would have thought. For vectors you need dimensions, and dimensions posit space."
Of course. The reverse wouldn't work.
"I remember trying to make sense of 'Being and Nothingness' as a teenager. 'Noumenal' wasn't even in the glossary."
There's your phenomenal ontology, right there. Bleeding French.
"Meanwhile I reckon the sum of an infinite series goes a long way to solve some of Zeno's puzzlers."
Yes. Do you propose this as a solution to the infinite Creations your position implies? If your position requires a sum to make it work then why bother with a series at all? Not parsimonious, is it? Too many steps. Unnecessary entities; shedloads of them.
"I wonder which one you mean because I don't think that there is a sharp distinction myself."
You relate Theseus' Ship and then you say:
"That is because it is the 'closest known follower' of the original and there is a continous spacio-temporal trace linking them."
http://philochristos.blogspot.com/2005/08/argument-for-substance-dualism.html#c114503238588886239
You propose an ideal identity independent of substance yet somehow imprinted upon it. Theseus' Ship is intended to make people think about the difference beween meaning and matter; it is not meant to be taken literally and certainly does not work as an illustration of your ontology. If you do not understand why then here are some smelling salts for you:
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-8463171013501945812&q=%22rupert+sheldrake%22
It is particularly interesting at 8 minutes and 50 seconds.
I'm not. Language did not evolve that it might describe itself.
There you go again. The ability of language to describe itself arises from the its nature as a describing thing. The ability to apply it recursively and to make structures of abstract elements is a property of our linguistic sophistication compared to the insects.
Lewis?
It wasn't a conscious reference, I've never read any apart from one Narnia book. Oh, you mean Kellogg? Not read him either.
Oh my, yes. But only if I could redecorate afterwards.
So you don't like beige?
Don't you think Berserkers are a good idea for a budding galactic hegemony?
Well only if the light barrier can be broken or side stepped but I suppose that is a given with this kind of thing.
Yes. Do you propose this as a solution to the infinite Creations your position implies? If your position requires a sum to make it work then why bother with a series at all? Not parsimonious, is it? Too many steps. Unnecessary entities; shedloads of them.
I don't think my position does imply that.
That is because it is the 'closest known follower' of the original and there is a continous spacio-temporal trace linking them
I don't see why this is incompatible with perdurantism. Just because humans stand in a certain semantic and functional relation to an entity like a ship it does not mean we cannot see each timber as a hyperworm. I agree with you about not taking it literally. On the other hand why should 'objects' be preserved at this level of describing reality? Isn't that a problem for perdurantism?
You propose an ideal identity independent of substance yet somehow imprinted upon it. Theseus' Ship is intended to make people think about the difference beween meaning and matter; it is not meant to be taken literally and certainly does not work as an illustration of your ontology.
I don't think I was taking it literally. I'll come back to this when I've checked out the link though.
Sheldrake is an interesting character. Did you hear him on the radio a few months ago talking about 'telephone telepathy'? I am not at all persuaded by his ideas mind you.
I think I stand by my statement about Currys. i suppose it wouldn't matter if it were Comet or even PC world though.
"The ability to apply it recursively and to make structures of abstract elements is a property of our linguistic sophistication compared to the insects."
And there's you, judging the quality of a language by its sophistication rather than its effective utility, again.
"It wasn't a conscious reference, I've never read any apart from one Narnia book."
The Magician's Nephew is the best, in my judgement. Please try some of his Christian stuff. They are each really rather short, well-written and quite influential. Try the Screwtape books; sinister and funny.
"So you don't like beige?"
Nor tope. That there are no beige or tope flowers is likely evidence of an intelligent designer, or at least one with a good eye for colour.
"Well only if the light barrier can be broken or side stepped but I suppose that is a given with this kind of thing."
I suppose if they are sent out strategically using everyday clunk-drives as soon as the autonomous detection, navigation and extermination technology is pragmatic then it might be worthwhile over the long term. A Berserker would not need to sterilise every intelligence-bearing world it discovered. Perhaps only those with artificial satellites.
While on the subject of breaking the light barrier, here is the video for Portishead's Wandering Star:
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=6000560066363455352&q=%22portishead%22
At 2 minutes and 22 seconds there is a super visualisation of a wormhole. I've been wracking my brain to recall where I may have seen it before. Any ideas if it has appeared in a particular documentary?
Still with galactic hegemonies and wormholes, the best speculative ideas I have read lately are those of Iain M. Banks. The Algebraist is a blinder.
"I don't think my position does imply that."
Well, let's see. Consider yourself, please. Are you a single entity extended through space or are you a huge series of entities, one for every instant that passes, hanging like beads from a single thread of identity? Whence the beads? Whence the thread? Steps; too many of them. Unnecessary entities; shedloads of them.
"I don't see why this is incompatible with perdurantism."
Perdurantism does not require "traces" in some kind of ether to confer identity. A thing is its own identity.
"Just because humans stand in a certain semantic and functional relation to an entity like a ship it does not mean we cannot see each timber as a hyperworm."
Each of the original timbers, yes, but you argue that the identity of the ship resides with the new timbers.
"I agree with you about not taking it literally. On the other hand why should 'objects' be preserved at this level of describing reality?"
I have no idea as to "why" at this time, although I can give arguments I do not understand the necessity, but I am certain that it is the case that while objects are starkly discrete in the phenomenal they are discrete in the noumenal in the same way that there are discrete warm and cold fronts in the atmnosphere and currents in the oceans, flames in a fire and snowflakes in a snow-storm.
"Isn't that a problem for perdurantism?"
I do not think so. Could you explain why you think this?
"I don't think I was taking it literally."
Then it wasn't ever going to be of any use in an argument about ontology.
"Sheldrake is an interesting character. Did you hear him on the radio a few months ago talking about 'telephone telepathy'?"
I did not. I read ANSOL quite some years ago and did not find it particularly bizarre. I do not think that morphic resonance is necessarily wrong but I think that it is being spread too widely as a possible explanation for a number of apparent phenomena while its initial hypothesis yet lacks useful evidence.
"I am not at all persuaded by his ideas mind you."
Nor I, but it does engage me, especially as a challenge to those idiots who feel that the discovery of DNA and its idiosyncratic mapping answers all questions about life. That jerk I mentioned earlier in the week, for example, the Dawkins' Witness, has written of science explaining the origin of life. More power to Sheldrake, I say. We cannot know if he is onto something or not but he is certainly worth watching. At least morphic fields might be detected, unlike memes.
"I think I stand by my statement about Currys."
Is the application of an idea to a consumer product your general guide to its value? Currys will persuade you of ideas around electromagnetism, but that's it.
And there's you, judging the quality of a language by its sophistication rather than its effective utility, again.
Our sophisticated language ability has enabled the development of pest control.
I suppose if they are sent out strategically using everyday clunk-drives...
Then most civilisations will have come and gone without a significant chance of encountering a berserker I reckon. Back of an envelope calculation should settle it.
I've not seen that black hole footage before.
I must get round to reading The Algebraist. I'm such a slow reader though.
Whence the beads? Whence the thread? Steps; too many of them. Unnecessary entities; shedloads of them.
I don't think my position entails these things though.
Perdurantism does not require "traces" in some kind of ether to confer identity. A thing is its own identity.
If you trace the shadow of a Necker cube you get two interlocking squares. If you view a hyperworm from within our perceptual restrictions you see a spatio-temporal trace. This is human dialogue with reality resulting in the phenomenal world.
Each of the original timbers, yes, but you argue that the identity of the ship resides with the new timbers.
I am arguing that identity is a human construct and perdurantism has very little to say about whether it is the same ship or still your grandmother.
There are discrete snowflakes in a snowstorm but I take the point about flames. I like that simile.
I do not think so. Could you explain why you think this?
If perdurantism says that objects like chairs or grandmothers are hyperworms then what are we to say about their constituent atoms or molecules? Does this structure form a hyperhydra? What level of description is apposite for a block universe? Why assume that there are any persisting objects as such at this level? I just wonder what this theory buys us. If differentiation is a property of the phenomenal world as is time and extension in space then what problem does perdurantism solve?
Then it wasn't ever going to be of any use in an argument about ontology.
I don't think identity is purely ontological.
Is the application of an idea to a consumer product your general guide to its value? Currys will persuade you of ideas around electromagnetism, but that's it.
I would not say general guide. I would say it is a very tangible endorsement of a working model. If no experimental design can expose the predictions of a model to attempts at falsification then the Currys stage is way down the line. What experiments can you think of for perdurantism?
"Our sophisticated language ability has enabled the development of pest control."
Expel Nature, she comes back at the double.
"Back of an envelope calculation should settle it."
I understand your objection but it would be a speculative calculation. We may be the first civilisation and may not be followed by another for a great long time. If Berserkers are a sensible strategy, and judging from the rhymes of history it may be so, and if we are late to emerge as a civilisation then why have we not yet encountered any?
"I've not seen that black hole footage before."
Thanks for looking. It seems familiar to me. Most of the video seems to be a collection of CGI from documentaries. Great song too. Lovey voice, that Beth Gibbons.
"I must get round to reading The Algebraist. I'm such a slow reader though."
It really is fun. Even the grammar is fun, as Banks seems frequently to forget about full stops. Do you have a favourite science fiction story among those he has written?
"I don't think my position entails these things though."
Then I may have misunderstoon your position and if I have then I apologise. Please explain your position.
"If you trace the shadow of a Necker cube you get two interlocking squares. If you view a hyperworm from within our perceptual restrictions you see a spatio-temporal trace. This is human dialogue with reality resulting in the phenomenal world."
Yes but the phenomenal is only appearance and not substance. The trace of an entity is not that entity.
"I am arguing that identity is a human construct and perdurantism has very little to say about whether it is the same ship"
I disagree. Descriptions and names are human constructs but identity is independent of language. Things are pragmatically discrete. Perdurantism tells us that a reconstruction of a thing is not the original thing.
"There are discrete snowflakes in a snowstorm but I take the point about flames. I like that simile."
Yes, there are discrete snowflakes, as there are discrete regions of particular temperatures within the oceans and the airs. Not static regions, though. Their constituents change just as ours change.
What is it that you like about the flame simile?
"If perdurantism says that objects like chairs or grandmothers are hyperworms then what are we to say about their constituent atoms or molecules?"
Ditto, really, although I waver in my fondness for the prefix "hyper-". It's a useful abbreviation but it does rather give the impression that there are transcendent dimensions when in fact we are really talking about our own when they extend beyond the horizon. It all makes for very pretty geometry, all this hyperstuff, but it's unnecessarily complicated and simply leads to further problems.
"Does this structure form a hyperhydra? What level of description is apposite for a block universe?"
No. Imagine yourself walking through a fog with an effective visibility of, say, 5 feet. The descriptions that work 5 feet from your door work at 10 feet from your door, &c. That's it, basically.
"Why assume that there are any persisting objects as such at this level?"
No assumption necessary. Look around you. Things persist in a block universe, as words in candy rock.
"I just wonder what this theory buys us. If differentiation is a property of the phenomenal world as is time and extension in space then what problem does perdurantism solve?"
What it buys us? Satisfaction, of course. What else would anyone want?
Time is only extension in space. Differentiation is a property of the noumenal represented in phenomena. Entities extend beyond their phenomenology into past space and future space.
Their are several problems solved by perdurantism. One is the confusion caused by thinking of reality as a series of editions. Whence these editions? What is the answer and why? It's a bloody baroque description of the world, and begs more questions than it solves, begs mechanisms and logical puzzles. Reductive atomism breeding complexity. If we instead regard the universe as a block then we close the door on further metaphysics and, also, on the interventionist monsters of theology.
"I don't think identity is purely ontological."
I don't think identity is purely phenomenal. Snowflakes were what they are before we named them snowflakes.
"I would say it is a very tangible endorsement of a working model."
Tell the boys and girls at CERN.
"What experiments can you think of for perdurantism?"
Cut your arm then look to a clock in your room for a minute. Look back to your arm. If the cut is still there then you are the same entity which cut its arm, extended through space. If the cut is no longer there then you are not the same entity which occupied a particular space a minute ago but merely the "closest known follower".
Before you offer any objections think about their implications for each element of the experiment and the sense of those implications.
Buzz, buzz, buzz.
I'll think on that for a while. Now, where did I put the fly spray...
Pleese ekscuice ther embaresing tipograffical erras wher yu sea therm, wud yu? Fanx.
Typographical errors yes, but breakdancing is taking things too far.
"Typographical errors yes, but breakdancing is taking things too far."
I prefer trip-hop. And Harold Arlen.
The reason that I don't think my position entails a series view is that I think the closest known follower idea is very much based in the phenomenal world and addresses human notions of identity as perceived through time. I do not see this as incompatible with a perdurantist view from nowhen. When I said that the sum of an infinite series is a solution to some of Zeno's puzzlers, I was thinking of a calculus solution of Achilles and the Tortoise rather than generalising to an ontology of objects persisting through time. However, it is worth reflecting that philosophers don't all buy the idea that calculus solves the paradox at a deeper level and ironically the problems of motion might be better solved by quantizing time and space. Zeno territory indeed.
If Berserkers are a sensible strategy, and judging from the rhymes of history it may be so, and if we are late to emerge as a civilisation then why have we not yet encountered any?
This was addressed in the Wiki article on Berserkers-the Sagan Response. But perhaps each berserker scheme begets qwib-qwibs from the opposition. I haven't read any science fiction apart from 'The Time Traveller's Wife' in about 20 years.
Yes but the phenomenal is only appearance and not substance. The trace of an entity is not that entity.
That's my point really, the trace is a way of dealing with human concerns in the phenomenal world.
What is it that you like about the flame simile?
Humans name these 'objects' of perception 'flames' but even within the phenomenal world it is clear that fire is not really composed of discrete entities called 'flames'.
No assumption necessary. Look around you. Things persist in a block universe, as words in candy rock.
This is where the problems might begin. What is it that distinguishes the words from the rest of the rock? the colour I think. Colour is a property of the phenomenal world. But just how far does perdurantism want to go toward the noumenal?
Time is only extension in space. Differentiation is a property of the noumenal represented in phenomena. Entities extend beyond their phenomenology into past space and future space.
My problem is not with time as an extension in space, the block view or even accepting differentiation into objects as a necessary constituent of phenomena. We start to skate on thin ice if we want to say what property of the noumenon this differentiation corresponds to though. This is why I don't really think perdurantism solves problems of identity through time. Identity of objects is about the phenomenal world and if you want to say that truth is a function of language then whether or not it is the same ship is too.
I don't think identity is purely phenomenal. Snowflakes were what they are before we named them snowflakes.
I agree the phenomenon is not its label but nor is it the noumenon. Human decisions about identity through time reduce to propositions about the appropriate application of labels to phenomena. The worms for each individual particle (or string or whatever physical model you want to use) that will ever form part of the ship might be like a topologically interesting glomerulus within the block universe but it won't settle our human concerns about whether it is the same old ship of Theseus.
"The reason that I don't think my position entails a series view is that I think the closest known follower idea is very much based in the phenomenal world and addresses human notions of identity as perceived through time."
Which humans and what notions? The intuitive position is that the identities persists from moment to moment. Meanwhile, if you have one thing following another then you have a series.
"I do not see this as incompatible with a perdurantist view from nowhen."
That all depends up what "this" may be; I shall await your answer to the above question.
"However, it is worth reflecting that philosophers don't all buy the idea that calculus solves the paradox at a deeper level and ironically the problems of motion might be better solved by quantizing time and space. Zeno territory indeed."
Yes, and totally wrong-headed. I do the odd bit of long division here and there, yes, but, come on, this is practically theology:
http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/
classics/leibniz/monad.htm
"This was addressed in the Wiki article on Berserkers-the Sagan Response. But perhaps each berserker scheme begets qwib-qwibs from the opposition."
I would expect a Berserker would polish off a few worlds before being polished off itself. As for Sagan's Response, why should it be assumed that probes would be programmed to replicate endlessly?
"I haven't read any science fiction apart from 'The Time Traveller's Wife' in about 20 years."
I have read a fair amount of science fiction over the last 20 years. I have not read "The Time Traveller's Wife"; it does not sound particularly interesting nor does it sound as though it is what I would consider to be science fiction but rather something of a thought experiment without any clear hypothesis.
"That's my point really, the trace is a way of dealing with human concerns in the phenomenal world."
Which human concerns and how does this work?
"Humans name these 'objects' of perception 'flames' but even within the phenomenal world it is clear that fire is not really composed of discrete entities called 'flames'."
I disagree. Flames are discrete, they are simply more discrete, remebering that time is extension in space, than most things we normally deal with.
"This is where the problems might begin. What is it that distinguishes the words from the rest of the rock? the colour I think. Colour is a property of the phenomenal world."
No problem there. Colour is an interpretation of the noumenal and as such is very much founded in the real. Works fine.
"But just how far does perdurantism want to go toward the noumenal?"
Perdurantism directly addresses the noumenal.
"We start to skate on thin ice if we want to say what property of the noumenon this differentiation corresponds to though."
Not about to, but I think it is a safe bet that all phenomena are representations of discrete properties of the noumenal.
"Identity of objects is about the phenomenal world and if you want to say that truth is a function of language then whether or not it is the same ship is too."
Descriptions and names are about the phenomenal world but identity is independent of language. Truth is an abstract concept with no foundation in the noumenal while a ship is a material construct founded in the noumenal; you cannot compare them.
"I agree the phenomenon is not its label but nor is it the noumenon."
Not quite what I am saying. The phenomenal is all label, or, to be more precise, representation, but it is still the noumenal. Snowflakes are what they are independently of our phenomenology.
"Human decisions about identity through time reduce to propositions about the appropriate application of labels to phenomena."
Yes, but these decisions are hardly arbitrary, are they.
"The worms for each individual particle (or string or whatever physical model you want to use) that will ever form part of the ship might be like a topologically interesting glomerulus within the block universe but it won't settle our human concerns about whether it is the same old ship of Theseus."
Yest it will. If I cut off your arm and throw it in the river then sew a piece of pork onto your shoulder, where is your arm?
Which humans and what notions? The intuitive position is that the identities persists from moment to moment. Meanwhile, if you have one thing following another then you have a series.
Lisa Jardine and her worries about the Cutty Sark for example.
As soon as you get into treating 'moments' literally then you are are back in Zenoland. Intuition only gets you so far.
That all depends up what "this" may be; I shall await your answer to the above question.
I don't really object to a perdurantist view of the world, only to the idea that is solves the problem of identity as expressed by the Ship of Theseus story.
Yes, and totally wrong-headed. I do the odd bit of long division here and there, yes, but, come on, this is practically theology:
Well, yes. But is perdurantism much better?
I have read a fair amount of science fiction over the last 20 years. I have not read "The Time Traveller's Wife"; it does not sound particularly interesting nor does it sound as though it is what I would consider to be science fiction but rather something of a thought experiment without any clear hypothesis.
Fair enough, I enjoyed it a lot. I'm not too much of a stickler for genre definitions either.
Which human concerns and how does this work?
The human concerns as to whether entity Y at time t+n is to be identified with entity X at time t. The closest known follower idea works by identifying the most continuous spacio-temporal trace whereas the perdurantist view might look at the dense topological undergrowth and produce the relevant shrub. Or worm.
I disagree. Flames are discrete, they are simply more discrete, remembering that time is extension in space, than most things we normally deal with.
Maybe in cartoon fires yes but when I look at fire itself I see a much more complicated process. Is that a forked flame or is it two joined at the base? Is this a new one or did the old one just fade and come back?
No problem there. Colour is an interpretation of the noumenal and as such is very much founded in the real. Works fine.
Colour is a phenomenal. What does 'interpretation' mean?
Perdurantism directly addresses the noumenal.
Really, be careful the ice is very thin there, I can hear it cracking.
Not about to, but I think it is a safe bet that all phenomena are representations of discrete properties of the noumenal.
Oh dear, it isn't safe at all and you have just fallen through. How shall we get the lager now?
Descriptions and names are about the phenomenal world but identity is independent of language. Truth is an abstract concept with no foundation in the noumenal while a ship is a material construct founded in the noumenal; you cannot compare them.
But is it true that it is the same ship? You see the identity of the ship is not the ship, it is a human construct.
Not quite what I am saying. The phenomenal is all label, or, to be more precise, representation, but it is still the noumenal. Snowflakes are what they are independently of our phenomenology.
Yes, although we can have no idea what that is like or what we would call 'them' if we did have an idea. So snowflakes are phenomena that we call snowflakes and their noumenal foundation is beyond our knowledge.
Yes, but these decisions are hardly arbitrary, are they.
I think that depends on your point of view.
Yest it will. If I cut off your arm and throw it in the river then sew a piece of pork onto your shoulder, where is your arm?
But that arm is likely to have particles within it that were once part of Napoleon. So from a true perdurantist point of view it is all tangled up whereas the closest known follower of my arm as was is the object now in the river. I must say your thought experiments are getting ever more drastic.
"As soon as you get into treating 'moments' literally then you are are back in Zenoland. Intuition only gets you so far."
Yes, which is why I think it is nonsense to speak of "quantizing time".
"I don't really object to a perdurantist view of the world, only to the idea that is solves the problem of identity as expressed by the Ship of Theseus story."
There is no problem. Take away the wood and you take away the ship. Simple as.
"Well, yes. But is perdurantism much better?"
Yes it is. Reduce space to quantities and I have you by the monads.
"I'm not too much of a stickler for genre definitions either."
Except with respect to thought.
"The closest known follower idea works by identifying the most continuous spacio-temporal trace"
I still do not follow you on this "spacio-temporal trace". What is its medium and why does an account of identity require such an entity? It sounds like you are speaking of a soul or a spirit, some essence which may migrate from one piece of matter to another, from the original ship of Theseus to its replica.
"Is that a forked flame or is it two joined at the base?"
If it is a forked flame then it is a discrete forked flame. If you see two flames then they are two discrete forked flames.
"Colour is a phenomenal. What does 'interpretation' mean?"
Colour is a phenomenon, yes, but there is no colour without eyes to interpret the light an object reflects. Objects simply are but experience of objects require observers.
"Really, be careful the ice is very thin there, I can hear it cracking."
The white zone is for loading and unloadng only.
"Oh dear, it isn't safe at all and you have just fallen through. How shall we get the lager now?"
If you gotta load or if you gotta unload, go to the white zone.
"But is it true that it is the same ship?"
From moment to moment? Yes.
"You see the identity of the ship is not the ship, it is a human construct."
If you never look beyond language, that is true. Language, however, talks about things that are in the world,
"So snowflakes are phenomena that we call snowflakes and their noumenal foundation is beyond our knowledge."
No. Snowflakes are discrete entities which have phenomenal impact. There are many things which exist without any phenomenal impact.
"But that arm is likely to have particles within it that were once part of Napoleon. So from a true perdurantist point of view it is all tangled up whereas the closest known follower of my arm as was is the object now in the river."
Napoleon was a pattern. Once that pattern has been destroyed so Napoleon has been destroyed. A part of Napoleon is not Napoleon any more than a shaving from one of your fingernails is you. Certainly it is your arm which is in the river and not you.
"I must say your thought experiments are getting ever more drastic."
You did not respond to the first experiment and so I had to get your attention somehow. It is a good thing that you responded to this experiment else things could have got messy. What about that first experiment, incidentally? You thought about it for a little while, I recall.
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Yes, which is why I think it is nonsense to speak of "quantizing time".
I don't think its quite the same. The point about moments is that they can be arbitrarily small, whereas if time were quantized, moments would take on a different connotation.
There is no problem. Take away the wood and you take away the ship. Simple as.
Napoleon was a pattern. Once that pattern has been destroyed so Napoleon has been destroyed. A part of Napoleon is not Napoleon any more than a shaving from one of your fingernails is you.
It seems to be Have It Both Ways Week. Why was I not told?
Yes it is. Reduce space to quantities and I have you by the monads.
Sorry, I'm not buying any theology today. I think you want the loading bay over there.
If you never look beyond language, that is true. Language, however, talks about things that are in the world,
You can't get behind language.
No. Snowflakes are discrete entities which have phenomenal impact.
There's that whopper again.
You thought about it for a little while, I recall.
I did. I am of the same conclusion though. In both cases there is the closest known follower, one has a preternatural healing ability perhaps.
"I don't think its quite the same. The point about moments is that they can be arbitrarily small, whereas if time were quantized, moments would take on a different connotation."
You should have thought of that before you mentioned Zenoland.
"It seems to be Have It Both Ways Week. Why was I not told?"
You had mounted a prospecting expedition to Zenoland, it seems.
"I'm not buying any theology today."
Then both of us disapprove of this idea.
"You can't get behind language."
I did not say you could. Language is representation. Look beyond language to the things it represents. Ships are human constructs and so are humans. Ships and humans are as real as one another; they are not simply linguistic conventions.
"There's that whopper again."
You think that snowflakes are not discrete entities? Do you think that cars in motorway traffic are not discrete entities?
"there is the closest known follower"
Whence?
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It's in the trees! It's coming!
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You should have thought of that before you mentioned Zenoland.
Actually it was you who invoked Zenoland in the reply that cited the philochristos argument. This was no doubt because you assumed some things about my position that are not true.
You had mounted a prospecting expedition to Zenoland, it seems.
That's very generous of you but I can't take the credit, it's all down to you.
I did not say you could. Language is representation. Look beyond language to the things it represents. Ships are human constructs and so are humans. Ships and humans are as real as one another; they are not simply linguistic conventions.
I agree they are as real as any other feature of the phenomenal world. The identity of a ship, on the other hand, could very well be a legal matter.
You think that snowflakes are not discrete entities?
By 'snowflakes' you mean those things out there in winter? Yes they are discrete entities, although they swirl rather. Still, they are phenomena so I have no problem with discrete phenomena.
Do you think that cars in motorway traffic are not discrete entities?
Cars these days are phenomenal don't you think? Full of gadgets.
Whence?
Was it you who asked that?
It's in the trees! It's coming!
Put it away! Honestly, boys and their whoppers...
"Actually it was you who invoked Zenoland in the reply that cited the philochristos argument."
I was referring to your mention of it in the post to which I was replying. Dear me; I doubt polygamy is this punishing.
"The identity of a ship, on the other hand, could very well be a legal matter."
All property is theft. Apparently.
"Yes they are discrete entities"
Inch by inch.
"Cars these days are phenomenal don't you think? Full of gadgets."
Can't abide them. They make the air dirty.
"Was it you who asked that?"
New balls, please.
"Put it away! Honestly, boys and their whoppers..."
Didn't they give those away with Whizzer and Chips and the like?
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I was referring to your mention of it in the post to which I was replying. Dear me; I doubt polygamy is this punishing.
Except that I did not mention it in the post to which you were replying. You can quickly check that this is the case by reading the post or by using the 'find on this page' function. Check for 'Zeno' and guess what, yours is the first mention.
You mentioned Zeno because you were mistaken about what the closest known follower entails. Now, time for you to roll over without a fuss because the evidence is right here on the thread.
"Except that I did not mention it in the post to which you were replying."
Here is your post:
"As soon as you get into treating 'moments' literally then you are are back in Zenoland. Intuition only gets you so far.
[...]
5:13 PM"
And here is my reply:
""I don't think its quite the same. The point about moments is that they can be arbitrarily small, whereas if time were quantized, moments would take on a different connotation."
You should have thought of that before you mentioned Zenoland.
[...]
6:52 PM"
There you are; your post and my reply to it.
"Now, time for you to roll over without a fuss because the evidence is right here on the thread."
The question is not one of whom mentioned Zenoland first but whether you mentioned it in criticism of the "quantizing of time and space". You did.
I do not know why you do it but you seem fond of throwing in ideas only to disavow them later. What point did you hope to make by mentioning "quantizing time and space" if you would not abide by it?
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The question is not one of whom mentioned Zenoland first but whether you mentioned it in criticism of the "quantizing of time and space". You did.
Ah, sorry I misunderstood. My mention of it was a reference back to your mention of it which was first. I'm glad that is cleared up without anybody needing to beg. Or fetch.
I do not know why you do it but you seem fond of throwing in ideas only to disavow them later.
Not at all. I disavow your rather idiosyncratic interpretations of what I have said.
What point did you hope to make by mentioning "quantizing time and space" if you would not abide by it?
It was a subtle point, I admit. I'll try to explain further.
If you remember, your first invocation of Zeno was to show the absurdity of a sum of infinite instances. You had assumed (without warrant) that the closest known follower entails this. I picked up on your Zeno reference to note the irony that a solution to Zeno's Achilles and the Tortoise paradox might depend on something very like the thing you were using Zeno to illustrate the absurdity of. However when you pressed the point of the absurdity (presumably having missed the irony) I felt it worthwhile to point out that quantizing time is not at all the same as postulating an infinite series of moments. This is because a quantum of time would have a size below which time would not be divisible, whereas a moment is arbitrarily small. Sorry I did not make this clearer first time round.
"I disavow your rather idiosyncratic interpretations of what I have said."
I welcome your idiosyncratic reaction.
"You had assumed (without warrant) that the closest known follower entails this."
Without further formulation it does indeed.
"However when you pressed the point of the absurdity (presumably having missed the irony) I felt it worthwhile to point out that quantizing time is not at all the same as postulating an infinite series of moments. This is because a quantum of time would have a size below which time would not be divisible, whereas a moment is arbitrarily small. Sorry I did not make this clearer first time round."
Thank you. A indivisible quantum of time would have to be infinitely small. This being so any period of time would encompass an infinity of such quanta. Absurdity. Zenoland.
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A indivisible quantum of time would have to be infinitely small.
Why?
An indivisible quantum of time, damn it.
"Why?"
Otherwise it is divisible.
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Otherwise it is divisible.
No that's the whole idea of 'grainy' reality, that below certain sizes it really isn't divisible any more.
"that's the whole idea of 'grainy' reality, that below certain sizes it really isn't divisible any more."
Grains are divisible.
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Grains are divisible.
Quanta are not.
"Quanta are not."
By definition only, it seems.
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By definition only, it seems.
Well, that's why I used the term 'quntized' to signify an indivisible yet not arbitrarily small unit. Good, language, isn't it?
So which experiments involving the division of quanta were you thinking of?
"Well, that's why I used the term 'quntized' to signify an indivisible yet not arbitrarily small unit."
Everything may be divided.
"Good, language, isn't it?"
I use it.
"So which experiments involving the division of quanta were you thinking of?"
Oh. I am sure that there will be some along sooner or later. Of which quanta were you thinking?
How did we get into this daft conversation?
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Everything may be divided.
Really? What is the taste of a peach divided by seven?
I use it.
I agree that much.
Oh. I am sure that there will be some along sooner or later.
I wouldn't rule it out.
Of which quanta were you thinking?
Any.
How did we get into this daft conversation?
Care to tango?
"What is the taste of a peach divided by seven?"
Turqouise.
"Any."
What sound does a crow make?
"Care to tango?"
I prefer cream soda with a dollop of ice cream in the glass.
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Turqouise.
I look forward to your demonstration of that.
What sound does a crow make?
Not as rattly as magpies, why do you ask?
I prefer cream soda with a dollop of ice cream in the glass.
Can't say I'm tempted.
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