Are moral values things that are part of the universe itself in the sense that they would exist even if all sentient lifeforms had ceased to exist? One of the pillars of the theist worldview is that some moral values express things that are objectively true. But wait a minute, haven't we all learned that you can't derive an 'ought' from an 'is' ? Yet people experience the world as if some things are objectively right or wrong. If this cannot be because of the way the world is, theists conclude that the guarantor of these objective moral truths must be God. There is a well known problem with this: it is the Euthyphro dilemma. Is something good because god commands it, or does God command it because it is good? If the former, then what if God had commanded otherwise? It makes morality seem arbitrary. If the latter, then 'good' already existed and God cannot be its guarantor.
So how would a secular account look? Does secularism entail moral relativism in the sense that what is 'right' or 'wrong' is just a matter of cultural preference or societal sanction? I think not. I think that evolution by natural selection has provided us with the ability to track certain aspects of the world. Part of our world is the social nexus. We have a theory of mind. We can predict what somebody else will do sometimes because we can imagine what it is like to be them. This has consequences in terms of which sets of behaviours will maximise survival. Go around arbitrarily killing and stealing and you won't last long enough to reproduce. So we are equipped with a set of 'ethical drivers' which profoundly influence our perception and emotions about our possible behaviours. There is no guarantor in the sky, but just as Noam Chomsky speaks of 'universal grammar' such that humans have a predisposition to develop language, I am postulating (I'm sure I'm not the first) a universal ethics. Does this analogy fit? Well different societies have different ethical codes, but there are some invariant properties. There are no societies where murdering your firstborn is considered 'good'. Similarly English and German are very different but they both have verbs, adjectives and nouns.
So in order to function within a viable ethics, moral values must have certain invariant principles and in this sense there is an objective component. If humans went extinct tomorrow, the scavengers and saprophytes would feast on our corpses without any moral qualms and in this sense morals are subjective on a species level.
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- I'm a guitar player and tutor with a debilitating interest in philosophy.
56 comments:
"Yet people experience the world as if some things are objectively right or wrong."
How would we experience the world if some things weren't objectively right or wrong?
We would and do experience it as if some things were.
If you are asking what it would be like to experience the world as somebody who does not perceive right and wrong as attributes of behaviour, then I don't know because I am human and not a psychopath. You might as well ask me what it is like to be a bat.
"We would and do experience it as if some things were."
So perhaps some things are objectively right or wrong. Why would this be so?
"You might as well ask me what it is like to be a bat."
Or what it is like to be me. Not that I am either a bat or a psychopath; I am not about to admit to either in the current climate. You seem to imply that it is human to experience things as right and wrong and that psychopaths do not experience right or wrong. Does this mean that you do not regard psychopaths as human?
If psychopaths do not perceive things as you and I, presumably, as objectively right or wrong then there cannot be any objective rights or wrongs. We cannot account for this putative deficit by saying that psychopaths lack particular faculties because we do not know what these may be nor what it is these might perceive. We know that some people are better with numbers than others but we do not know why this is so nor what it is about numbers that is perceived. It is the same with right and wrong.
So, if there are no objective rights or wrongs then we are free to regard the appreciation of right and wrong as a skill, which we may exercise for our own pleasure or advancement or the betterment of our society or for all three.
I nearly fell off the roof, earlier; this evening's Time Team is actually interesting. Squeak.
So perhaps some things are objectively right or wrong. Why would this be so?
Perhaps some things are, I agree.
Why would this be so? That would depend on our use of terms like 'objective'. It can get quite fiddly.
You seem to imply that it is human to experience things as right and wrong and that psychopaths do not experience right or wrong. Does this mean that you do not regard psychopaths as human?
No. It is human to experience the colour green but blind people are human.
If psychopaths do not perceive things as you and I, presumably, as objectively right or wrong then there cannot be any objective rights or wrongs.
I'll accept that if you will accept that there are no green objects. That should not be difficult since there aren't any. But would it matter if 'right' and 'wrong' were exactly as subjective as 'green'? Clearly not for my purposes. Before colour and vision were understood we could give no detail on the deficit of colour blindness but accounts involving this deficit would still have made sense.
So, if there are no objective rights or wrongs then we are free to regard the appreciation of right and wrong as a skill, which we may exercise for our own pleasure or advancement or the betterment of our society or for all three.
Surely this could be true even if there are objective rights and wrongs? Unless it was objectively wrong to regard our appreciation of right and wrong in this way I suppose.
"Why would this be so? That would depend on our use of terms like 'objective'. It can get quite fiddly."
The Bleeding Obvious. It's very unlikely that a person would mistake a mouse for an elephant. If right and wrong were objective then they could not be mistaken for one another and there would be no reason
to treat one as the other in the same way that people do not use mice to move lumber and do not place little wheels in elephant houses at zoos
"No. It is human to experience the colour green but blind people are human."
Just so.
"I'll accept that if you will accept that there are no green objects. That should not be difficult since there
aren't any."
Well, that's that cleared up then. There are no objective rights and wrongs.
"But would it matter if 'right' and 'wrong' were exactly as subjective as 'green'?"
Yes. I do not care if you feel an apple is red or green. I care if you steal from me or murder my neighbour.
"Surely this could be true even if there are objective rights and wrongs?"
We would have no choice. We would be compelled to act in accord with what is right and avoid that which is wrong, as we seek pleasure and avoid pain. A thing recognised as obvious inevitably determines our behaviour and regard towards it.
So you think that things that are objectively different are necessarily bleeding obvious? So what about a fake painting that fools art experts for decades but is then forensically exposed?
Also, even if there were objective 'right' and 'wrong' it does not follow that we would be able to flawlessly discriminate them.
I do not care if you feel an apple is red or green. I care if you steal from me or murder my neighbour.
But if I am just as likely to feel that stealing from you or murdering your neighbour is wrong as I am to see the apple is red if you do also, then that is pretty good in my book. Better than things actually are in fact.
"So you think that things that are objectively different are necessarily bleeding obvious?"
No, that's my definition of objective; Bleeding Obvious. Things may be Bleeding Obvious in isolation, Bleeding Obviously similar or Bleeding Obviously different.
"Also, even if there were objective 'right' and 'wrong' it does not follow that we would be able to flawlessly discriminate them."
Which does not break my definition of objective. I agree with you but I think it's unlikely in practice.
"But if I am just as likely to feel that stealing from you or murdering your neighbour is wrong as I am to see the apple is red if you do also, then that is pretty good in my book. Better than things actually are in fact."
Apprently this is not inevitable. You introduced the analogy of colour-blindness, you remember.
What's up with the time stamp on this thing?
(4th March, 2007.)
No, that's my definition of objective; Bleeding Obvious.
Er..ok.
Which does not break my definition of objective. I agree with you but I think it's unlikely in practice.
Well now I understand your definition I see how your comment about being compelled to act in accordance makes sense.
Apprently this is not inevitable. You introduced the analogy of colour-blindness, you remember.
I do. And psychopaths. That is part of the analogy. So I agree, it is not inevitable. Far from it.
I have never paid any attention to the time stamp. I bet its EST or something.
"Er..ok."
I think you get the idea but there's an awful lot of buzzing bottles on this blog and if I can avoid adding to the noise I shall.
"Well now I understand your definition I see how your comment about being compelled to act in accordance makes sense."
Is it a definition you with which you agree?
"I do. And psychopaths. That is part of the analogy. So I agree, it is not inevitable. Far from it."
I fear you are implicitly labelling a great many people as psychopath.
"I bet its EST or something."
Pacific, I think.
(4th March, 2007. I'm sure.)
Is it a definition you with which you agree?
Absolutely not. Obviousness has a non trivial arbitrariness about it.
I fear you are implicitly labelling a great many people as psychopath.
No. I think the diagnostic criteria could be sound for that. There are some invariants in morality but I really think it is like language. The genetic propensity initiates a dialog with the world that negotiates the setting of the predicates.
Pacific, I think.
Could be.
"Absolutely not. Obviousness has a non trivial arbitrariness about it."
So, were we living in a world of objective rights and wrongs in the same way that we live in a world of objective hot and cold you would not accept the obvious until you had measured the extent to which a right was objective and a wrong was objective? Were you to stumble and place your hand among the hot coals in the hearth would you not pull your hand away immediately until you had instrumentally measured the temperature of the coals and calculated the speed and depth of the heat's penetration into your flesh?
"No. I think the diagnostic criteria could be sound for that."
Yes, if we accept that psychopathy has any objective reality. I bristle when I see psychopaths referenced as some kind of a moral or human equivalant of absolute zero. In our discussion the term signifies the moral equivalent of a blind person but it is not my position that psychopaths are a breed apart, not a category of ophidian Hydes immune to the affect of others and unable by nature to grasp morality and ethics. For example:
http://www.hare.org/
"Snakes in Suits". Money-grubbing snake-oil, nothing more. I deplore the dehumanising of any humans. Psychopaths, whose existence is supported by nothing more significant than sophisticated opinion, have been elevated to the status of a Terror, along with "devil dogs" and "alien abductions", a phenomenon around which miserable people may build their lives:
http://groups.msn.com/psychopath
Take a good long look at that site. It's laughable in one respect but appalling in another. Robert Hare and the like are rendering psychology to a pap about as scientific in its assertions as reiki, person-centred counselling and hypnotherapy, giving license for people to identify one another as monsters.
"There are some invariants in morality but I really think it is like language."
I don't. I think morality is, like truth, a function of language. We can identify the atoms of language and locate its physical substrate. We cannot do the second with morality because when we consider morality as something other than a function of language we cannot find its atoms nor, consequently, its physical substrate.
"The genetic propensity initiates a dialog with the world that negotiates the setting of the predicates."
The genetic propensity for morality as something biologically and chemically objective or for behaviour we would identify as moral according to our current prejudicies?
Heres something for your coffee break:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/comedy/
apethatgotlucky.shtml
Addison did something very funny with history last year, I recall. This is very much in the same vein. Here is the Listen Again link:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio/aod/mainframe.shtml?http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio/aod/comedy.shtml?radio4/ape_got_lucky
If you have ever thought of domesticating monks, why is your business, then this is the programme for you. Professor Austin Herring makes a welcome return to Radio 4, this time in his role as Emeritus Professor of Anthropology at St Dunstan's College Cambridge.
10th March, 2007. 10:36.
So, were we living in a world of objective rights and wrongs in the same way that we live in a world of objective hot and cold you would not accept the obvious until you had measured the extent to which a right was objective and a wrong was objective?
Have you ever seen the experiment where somebody is blindfolded and has one hand immersed in a cold bucket of water and one in a warm one? They then have their hands put in a bucket of tepid water. They experience the situation as if there are two buckets, one containing warm and one cold water. I just think in the context of something as complex as human interaction, the Bleeding Obvious just doesn't cut it as an indicator of objective status of moral values.
Yes, if we accept that psychopathy has any objective reality.
Remember, truth is a function of language so if we define the term 'psychopath' we can make it real!
Seriously, yes the concept is problematic, psychiatry is far from perfect and we might not totally disagree on this one.
I don't. I think morality is, like truth, a function of language. We can identify the atoms of language and locate its physical substrate. We cannot do the second with morality because when we consider morality as something other than a function of language we cannot find its atoms nor, consequently, its physical substrate.
I'm not convinced by this analysis. I think the truth thing might be a new post though, so I will return to this question.
The genetic propensity for morality as something biologically and chemically objective or for behaviour we would identify as moral according to our current prejudicies?
The moral predicates change with time as languages do. They vary from culture to culture as with language. The propensity for language is innate. The same is true for morality.
Heres something for your coffee break:
Thanks.
"They experience the situation as if there are two buckets, one containing warm and one cold water."
An objective response for those particular circumstances. I presume that the results of the experiment are repeatable, that you mention it. Blindfold a person or shine a strong torch directly into their eyes and they shall not see as they would under normal conditions; would this render light subjective? How about the sea shell to which this person's gaze was then directed?
It's highly unlikely that you would stumble and place your hands amongst the hot coals of your hearth while a participant in the experiment you describe.
"I just think in the context of something as complex as human interaction, the Bleeding Obvious just doesn't cut it as an indicator of objective status of moral values."
I have not said that it does but in a world of objective rights and objective wrongs it would. You agree with me that it would:
"Well now I understand your definition I see how your comment about being compelled to act in accordance makes sense."
I am not saying that we live in a world of objective rights and wrongs.
"Remember, truth is a function of language so if we define the term 'psychopath' we can make it real!"
For some people it is a very real condition yet I dissent, as I believe you do. So where is the truth here? Do you and I live in the true reality or a mutant reality?
"psychiatry is far from perfect"
A great many psychiatrists are frustrated dentists. The best we never hear about.
"I'm not convinced by this analysis. I think the truth thing might be a new post though, so I will return to this question."
There are three directions from which this might be approached; truth is either contingent or arbitrary or Platonic. Which do you prefer? So with morality?
"The moral predicates change with time as languages do. They vary from culture to culture as with language. The propensity for language is innate. The same is true for morality."
If morality changes from culture to culture what then is its medium? Is it transmitted by architecture? Perhaps cuisine? Toilet habits? None of these? What about language? Sound reasonable?
12th March 2007. 20:04.
I presume that the results of the experiment are repeatable, that you mention it.
It is not controversial, I've even seen it done on the telly.
Blindfold a person or shine a strong torch directly into their eyes and they shall not see as they would under normal conditions; would this render light subjective? How about the sea shell to which this person's gaze was then directed?
I think that the problem might be this dualism of subjective and objective.
You agree with me that it would:
Not at all. I said I can see what follows from your definition, the idea of being compelled to act, as if flinching from the hot coals. I go on to say that 'Bleeding Obvious' is not a good definition of 'objective' though.
On psychiatry, I suspect we broadly agree.
There are three directions from which this might be approached; truth is either contingent or arbitrary or Platonic. Which do you prefer? So with morality?
I don't know. Still brewing.
If morality changes from culture to culture what then is its medium?
Like language we learn it at our mother's knee and refine it in wider circles.
"I think that the problem might be this dualism of subjective and objective."
Which problem?
"I go on to say that 'Bleeding Obvious' is not a good definition of 'objective' though."
I am still waiting for a halfway effective objection to this, if such may be made. It seems you accept the sense completely but disagree only with the phrasing.
"Like language we learn it at our mother's knee and refine it in wider circles."
What is the medium through which a person learns morality at their mother's knee?
(15th March 2007. 23:37.)
Which problem?
I think the problem is manifest.
I am still waiting for a halfway effective objection to this, if such may be made.
I think you missed it. Some things are objective in the sense of being inter-subjectively validatable without being obvious and some things are obvious but wrong. I'm surprised you dispute it. Unless it is one of the things that I think is obvious but is just wrong. In which case I would expect nothing less from you.
What is the medium through which a person learns morality at their mother's knee?
I have heard that the ether might make a comeback despite Michelson-Morley. Unless you mean Omar the psychic who always used to sit at my mother's other knee. Medium? What is the medium through which we learn language? What an odd question.
"I think the problem is manifest."
Arguments around objectivity and subjectivity are needlessly sophisticated.
"Some things are objective in the sense of being inter-subjectively validatable without being obvious and some things are obvious but wrong."
If a person has the knowledge which enables them to validate something by whatever means then that something is Bleeding Obvious. It's only a matter of looking in the right direction.
"What is the medium through which we learn language? What an odd question."
If you think it is odd then I wonder that you ask it, but it is not so odd a question. The medium of language is the body.
(16th March 2007. 09:27.)
Arguments around objectivity and subjectivity are needlessly sophisticated.
Perhaps.
If a person has the knowledge which enables them to validate something by whatever means then that something is Bleeding Obvious. It's only a matter of looking in the right direction.
Nah, I don't buy that. The ways humans have of looking in the wrong direction are legion. Sometimes the means are very complicated methodologies. Bleeding Obvious just does not work to describe 'objective'. Unless you mean in retrospect I suppose, but even then I think something can be both objective and esoteric.
If you think it is odd then I wonder that you ask it,
I didn't so much ask it as repeat it. You asked it.
The medium of language is the body.
If that is what you mean by 'medium' then so it is with morality.
"The ways humans have of looking in the wrong direction are legion."
Yet still people manage to look in the right direction surprisingly frequently. If something is objectively right or objectively wrong then that knowledge is inevitable. Would you prefer that term to Bleeding Obvious? If I look to my desk and I see a yellow marble rather than a sea shell then then the knowledge of a yellow marble upon my desk is inevitable.
"Unless you mean in retrospect I suppose"
I mean upon observation.
"I think something can be both objective and esoteric."
As do I. The esoteric may be objective, as the mundane. Almost everyone will recognise a sea shell when they see one but few will differentiate on sight a Paper Fig from a Pear Whelk. It's all down to knowledge.
Were we living in a world of objective rights and wrongs then we should each be equipped with the knowledge of what is right and what is wrong, unlearnt and implicit. The knowledge of a thing as right and wrong would be inevitable because it would be recognition rather than decision. There could be no choice, no freedom. Were this translated to sea shells we would know a Paper Fig from a Pear Whelk irrespective of our experience or preference.
"I didn't so much ask it as repeat it. You asked it."
I did not ask about the medium through which we learn language.
"If that is what you mean by 'medium' then so it is with morality."
I have no difficulty with the identification of morality as behaviour. A subset of behaviour is still a behaviour.
(16th March 2007. 19:07.)
I did not ask about the medium through which we learn language.
Sorry, you are right and it is Bleeding Obvious and I was looking in the wrong direction! (It's been a difficult week).
I mean upon observation.
That is in retrospect because you would have to recognise what it is you have observed. If you recognise that it is a Paper Fig that you are looking at then it is bleeding obvious, if you cannot distinguish it because you do not have the necessary conceptual framework then you can observe it all you like but to no avail.
Were we living in a world of objective rights and wrongs then we should each be equipped with the knowledge of what is right and what is wrong, unlearnt and implicit.
Not really. We have to learn how to distinguish a Paper Fig from a Pear Whelk but it is still an objective matter.
I have no difficulty with the identification of morality as behaviour. A subset of behaviour is still a behaviour.
Nor do I.
"That is in retrospect because you would have to recognise what it is you have observed."
Look around you. Do you note an appreciable delay between your eyes passing a thing and your recognition of those things? So with objective rights and objective wrongs, were there such things.
"if you cannot distinguish it because you do not have the necessary conceptual framework then you can observe it all you like but to no avail."
Which is to say that knowledge of Paper Figs and Pear Whelks is not objective. Were it objective then they might be recognised at a glance. So would it be were right and wrong objective.
"Not really. We have to learn how to distinguish a Paper Fig from a Pear Whelk but it is still an objective matter."
The process of learning to diffentiate is subject to knowledge. We differentiate between pieces of knowledge not objects. When we recognise a thing without reference to knowledge, that is objective. We are not naturally imbued with the ability to recognise rights and wrongs because they are subject to great contingency. Right and wrong are functions of language.
"Nor do I."
So with truth.
(17th March 2007. 10:14.)
Look around you. Do you note an appreciable delay between your eyes passing a thing and your recognition of those things? So with objective rights and objective wrongs, were there such things.
I see two shells. One is a Paper Fig, the other is a Pear Whelk. For our purposes, we could say that this is objectively the case. However, there is an appreciable delay in my being able to distinguish them since I have to look up the difference. So, according to you this is Bleeding Obvious in such a way that those without the training cannot see it. This seems further to illustrate why 'Bleeding Obvious' was a poor choice of term.
Which is to say that knowledge of Paper Figs and Pear Whelks is not objective. Were it objective then they might be recognised at a glance. So would it be were right and wrong objective.
What your argument seems to show though, is that it is possible for right and wrong to have objective components whilst our knowledge of these need not be immediate.
We are not naturally imbued with the ability to recognise rights and wrongs because they are subject to great contingency.
This does not follow I think, though that depends what you mean by contingent. Is a Paper Fig contingently not a Pear Whelk?
Right and wrong are functions of language.
As with truth I think this is so, although I think it is only part of the story.
"However, there is an appreciable delay in my being able to distinguish them since I have to look up the difference."
You see two shells. You do not see a Paper Fig and a Pear Whelk until you have learned to differentiate the two, and you do so by reference to knowledge.
"However, there is an appreciable delay in my being able to distinguish them since I have to look up the difference."
That there are two shells is Bleeding Obvious to those who recognise shells by their features. That one of these shells is a Paper Fig and the other is a Pear Whelk is Bleeding Obvious to those who recognise these particular shells by their features.
"This seems further to illustrate why 'Bleeding Obvious' was a poor choice of term."
It does not begin such never mind further it. You are unable to recognise particular shells by name until you have learnt how to differentiate between them. If you recognise a thing then it is Bleeding Obvious.
"What your argument seems to show though, is that it is possible for right and wrong to have objective components whilst our knowledge of these need not be immediate."
It is possible for things which are right and wrong to have features, yes, but the meaning of a feature is not objective.
"This does not follow I think, though that depends what you mean by contingent."
Determined by circumstance.
"Is a Paper Fig contingently not a Pear Whelk?"
Are you contingently not me?
"As with truth I think this is so, although I think it is only part of the story."
It's intended as a sufficient account. Anything more is elaboration or error.
(19 March, 2007. 12:07.)
That there are two shells is Bleeding Obvious to those who recognise shells by their features. That one of these shells is a Paper Fig and the other is a Pear Whelk is Bleeding Obvious to those who recognise these particular shells by their features.
Ah, so what you are saying is that things that are Bleeding Obvious are Bleeding Obvious.
It does not begin such never mind further it. You are unable to recognise particular shells by name until you have learnt how to differentiate between them. If you recognise a thing then it is Bleeding Obvious.
Far be it from me to try to argue against a tautology.
It is possible for things which are right and wrong to have features, yes, but the meaning of a feature is not objective.
I put it to you that these features have a causal effect on our appraisal of meaning.
Are you contingently not me?
No.
It's intended as a sufficient account. Anything more is elaboration or error.
I appreciate the intention. Maybe it works. But I think there is more.
"Ah, so what you are saying is that things that are Bleeding Obvious are Bleeding Obvious."
I presume that by your comment you recognise and accept the meaning of Bleeding Obvious I use here, as you would accept the meaning of "an apple is an apple".
That which is recognised is Bleeding Obvious.
"Far be it from me to try to argue against a tautology."
Or recognise one.
"I put it to you that these features have a causal effect on our appraisal of meaning."
A contingent effect. Right and wrong change from culture to culture. Features are only features, they are not judgements. Or do you regard things in the world as the shadows of ideas?
"No."
Then we cannot be distinguished, one from the other. A peculiar state of affairs that, if you ask me. Why are you contingently not me?
"I appreciate the intention. Maybe it works. But I think there is more."
What more is necessary?
(20th March, 2007. 08:13.)
"I put it to you that these features have a causal effect on our appraisal of meaning."
Do the features of the night sky have a causal effect on our appraisal of meaning?
(20th March, 2007. 08:42.)
My message of 08:13 today; I meant to ask why are you not contingently not me?
(20th March, 2007. 16:19.)
Or recognise one.
Tut tut. Oh wait there is another, over there in that clearing. Look at the dappled sun pattern on its tough hide. No, there! ==> "an apple is an apple"
Let's leave the Bleeding Obvious behind. It is beginning to seem a little anaemic as a definition anyway.
A contingent effect. Right and wrong change from culture to culture. Features are only features, they are not judgements. Or do you regard things in the world as the shadows of ideas?
As I said, I am not Platonist. I think there are invariant properties to morality. I think morality is like language. German sounds very different to English and operates in some different ways. They both have Verb-Object clauses though. Language is a human construct as is morality. Both vary and are subjective in some aspects and objective in others.
I meant to ask why are you not contingently not me?
You already did. My answer is that I am necessarily not you.
I shall comment upon the rest later, but please let me refer you to an unanswered question:
"I put it to you that these features have a causal effect on our appraisal of meaning."
Do the features of the night sky have a causal effect on our appraisal of meaning?
(21st Match 2007. 12:18.)
Do the features of the night sky have a causal effect on our appraisal of meaning?
Depends on the context. They probably have a causal effect on what we mean by the term 'star' for example.
This came from a discussion about the status of moral values though. The objective features which influence our appraisal of the meaning of moral propositions are those which tend to make some moral values more likely than others. For example, a society which inculcated the moral 'go back on a promise when you feel like it' would not get very far.
"Tut tut. Oh wait there is another, over there in that clearing. Look at the dappled sun pattern on its tough hide. No, there! ==> "an apple is an apple""
It's a perfectly legal string which describes a thing in the world. Were I to say "truth is truth" then you might admonish me.
(22nd March, 2007. 10:00)
"It is beginning to seem a little anaemic as a definition anyway."
I regard as non-trivial anything which apparently merits the attention of others.
"As I said, I am not Platonist."
You are looking increasingly like a Platonist, e.g.:
"I think there are invariant properties to morality."
Is there anything in the world which is invariant? Not flesh, where morality is to be found, as flesh fails. Not in genes as these change. What, then, is invariant? The constants, are they discrete and necessary? Is morality encoded into the universe? No? Perhaps morality exists beyond the world, then? If not with the constants then with the Decans?
"German sounds very different to English and operates in some different ways. They both have Verb-Object clauses though. Language is a human construct as is morality. Both vary and are subjective in some aspects and objective in others."
It is necessary for humans to breathe with lungs and so every human has lungs yet not all animals have lungs. Necessity is not determined by coincidence.
"I am necessarily not you."
You say this because you know this, all your boxes are ticked, yet someone who does not know this may be mistaken or deceived into thinking the contrary. Identity is not objective unless it is recognised, agreed. A thing is not objective unless its features map to a representation held by its observer prior to observation.
(22nd March, 2007. 10:22.)
"Depends on the context. They probably have a causal effect on what we mean by the term 'star' for example."
No cause, then, but qualification of previously communicated representations, communicated among people, that is, and not from stars to people. Objects do not project meaning.
"The objective features which influence our appraisal of the meaning of moral propositions are those which tend to make some moral values more likely than others."
Where morality is concerned there are no objective features. Morality changes from culture to culture. Morality is an argument, even within cultures.
"For example, a society which inculcated the moral 'go back on a promise when you feel like it' would not get very far."
Under such circumstances people would feel like breaking a promise when it proved expedient to break a promise rather than doing so arbitrarily. This is very much the case here and now, I regret. People are not punished for breaking promises except where it is a matter of contract. How far has our society come? Is moral rectitude a necessary precursor to social success? What is social success?
If morality has invariant features then these must be a necessary part of the universe unless they have been instituted by a whimsical God. If morality is necessary then it must be impossible to contravene it, or if it is possible to commit crimes against necessary morality then there must be necessary and reflexive effects; where, then, are the Erinyes?
(22nd March, 2007. 10:40.)
It's a perfectly legal string which describes a thing in the world. Were I to say "truth is truth" then you might admonish me.
Hmm, perhaps your use of the term 'tautology' is as idiosyncratic as your use of 'grammar'. C'mon now, it was a tautology. Did you see the length of its tusks? You don't get those on your ordinary legal string.
"Did you see the length of its tusks? You don't get those on your ordinary legal string."
Sorry, old boy, but I don't wish to buy your white elephant.
(22nd March, 2007. 22:59.1)
I regard as non-trivial anything which apparently merits the attention of others.
Ok, but it is looking rather pale.
You are looking increasingly like a Platonist, e.g.:
"I think there are invariant properties to morality."
Is there anything in the world which is invariant? Not flesh, where morality is to be found, as flesh fails.
Well no. I wasn't talking about the world, I was talking about morality. It is a human construct, an abstraction, like a matrix. matrices have Eigenvalues but you would not say that there are Eigenvalues in the world. Or perhaps you would. Perhaps you would say that you have one written down in your book.
"Well no. I wasn't talking about the world, I was talking about morality. It is a human construct, an abstraction, like a matrix. matrices have Eigenvalues but you would not say that there are Eigenvalues in the world. Or perhaps you would. Perhaps you would say that you have one written down in your book."
How many white elephants do you have there? Do you think a handful of syllables will distract me from your implicit assertion that because some things are in our heads and not outside of our heads so they are not a part of the world? I think you must have been really walloping the sauce over at The Bull.
(22nd March, 2007. 23:25.)
"Well no. I wasn't talking about the world, I was talking about morality. It is a human construct, an abstraction, like a matrix."
Let me see if I have you right. By virtue of its human construction, morality is invariant?
Do you wish to try again?
(March 22nd, 2007. 23:28.)
Let me see if I have you right. By virtue of its human construction, morality is invariant?
Do you wish to try again?
I said there were invariant features. You really must stop trying to sum up everything I have said in ways that have such a small resemblance to their original meaning. Languages tend to have nouns and verbs. Ethical systems have prohibitions on promise breaking. You may point out that people break promises in the real world. I will point out that people sometimes say things like 'Gah', which has neither noun nor verb.
You say this because you know this, all your boxes are ticked, yet someone who does not know this may be mistaken or deceived into thinking the contrary. Identity is not objective unless it is recognised, agreed. A thing is not objective unless its features map to a representation held by its observer prior to observation.
I am necessarily not you. It does not matter if people know this or represent it. This is because truth is a function of language. So the meaning of the terms 'I' and 'you' in the sentence 'I am you' preclude its being true. this is not contingent but necessary.
"I said there were invariant features."
Among languages there are recurrent features but I would not describe these as invariant. Convergent, yes. To say that certain features of language are invariant is to imply a Form.
"Ethical systems have prohibitions on promise breaking."
Yet still people break promises therefore there can be no necessary ethics, there can only be what works best.
All rivers flow downhill. Is this because all rivers possess an invariant, discrete feature of FlowDownhillness and lack an invariant discrete feature of FlowUphillness?
"You may point out that people break promises in the real world. I will point out that people sometimes say things like 'Gah', which has neither noun nor verb."
Yes, which shows that neither language nor morality have necessary features or are the coherent systems they are often imagined to be.
(23rd March, 2007. 18:59.)
"I am necessarily not you. It does not matter if people know this or represent it. This is because truth is a function of language. So the meaning of the terms 'I' and 'you' in the sentence 'I am you' preclude its being true. this is not contingent but necessary."
You may look into a mirror and speak this to your reflection; the sentence would be true. A person could be tricked into believing your reflection was you, as a person could be tricked into believing that I was you. People are more complex than symbols, not so easiy distinguished.
(23rd March, 007. 19:13.)
All rivers flow downhill. Is this because all rivers possess an invariant, discrete feature of FlowDownhillness and lack an invariant discrete feature of FlowUphillness?
Ok, ethical systems operate within objective constraints as rivers tend to flow downhill. I abandon the term 'invariant' on receipt of your friendly teasing.
You may look into a mirror and speak this to your reflection; the sentence would be true. A person could be tricked into believing your reflection was you, as a person could be tricked into believing that I was you. People are more complex than symbols, not so easily distinguished.
Yup that's all fair enough. I'm still necessarily not you though.
"Ok, ethical systems operate within objective constraints as rivers tend to flow downhill."
I think this is a fair view.
Ethical systems are those practices which achieve goals. Ethical systems consist of broken promises as well as kept promises.
"I abandon the term 'invariant' on receipt of your friendly teasing."
Thank you. This rather kills the idea of a "universal ethics". Back to language, Chomsky's error is to treat linguistics as though it were number theory.
"Yup that's all fair enough. I'm still necessarily not you though."
There is nothing necessary about identity. It's all circumstance.
(24th March, 2007. 09:34.)
There is nothing necessary about identity. It's all circumstance.
One of the things that is necessary about identity is that once 'I' and 'you' can be assigned referents, they cannot by definition of the terms have the same referent.
I am necessarily not you, even though my existence is contingent, as is yours.
"One of the things that is necessary about identity is that once 'I' and 'you' can be assigned referents, they cannot by definition of the terms have the same referent."
Yet who it is to whom those referents are assigned is a matter of pure circumstance.
"I am necessarily not you, even though my existence is contingent, as is yours."
Where would we be without language.
"Let's leave the Bleeding Obvious behind."
Incidentally, when might I expect the royalty cheque?
Ha ha, I hope you had the foresight to register this unique phrase of yours.
Meanwhile, I made a reference to kenotic process theology, knowledge of which I owe to you and I got a reply which was an amusing rant, (message #260, Thought for the Day thread, The Bull.)
Yet who it is to whom those referents are assigned is a matter of pure circumstance.
True apart from the restriction that 'I' and 'you' cannot be meaningfully assigned the same referent in the same utterance unless there is a specific shift in point of view. So I could say: 'I reckon you are going to say to me "you are wrong about that."' 'I' and 'you' have the same referent. All that is irrelevant to the statement 'I am not you' which is a tautology.
"Ha ha, I hope you had the foresight to register this unique phrase of yours."
Well, it's only fair that I ask. Considering the infinite set of legal strings out there it's rather more than a coincidence that you alighted upon this one. However, I enjoy your discussion very much and won't press you on this.
"Meanwhile, I made a reference to kenotic process theology, knowledge of which I owe to you and I got a reply which was an amusing rant, (message #260, Thought for the Day thread, The Bull.)"
And what a rant. Reading it I felt I was falling down a hill.
I'm glad you have something new to enjoy. What do you make of it so far?
"All that is irrelevant to the statement 'I am not you' which is a tautology."
Well, I am glad that's cleared up.
Here is somewhere you may idle away a half hour with our friend John Polkinghorne:
http://www.starcourse.org/jcp/qanda.html#God_Delusion
Considering the infinite set of legal strings out there it's rather more than a coincidence that you alighted upon this one.
Gah, I admit it...(how often does a witness break down on the stand? Not often....sincere flattery though eh?)
And what a rant. Reading it I felt I was falling down a hill.
Good, it's not just me then.
I'm glad you have something new to enjoy. What do you make of it so far?
Mad as a box of spiders.
Here is somewhere you may idle away a half hour with our friend John Polkinghorne:
Thank you.
"Mad as a box of spiders."
You love it, you slaag.
You love it, you slaag.
'Tis a fair cop.
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