What does it mean to say that somebody believes something?
I think that a belief is a mental state, representational in character, taking as its content something that could in principle be stated as a proposition. To believe p is to hold that p is true.
How can we distinguish between believing that we hold that p is true and actually holding it to be true? Beliefs predispose us to certain behaviours. If we consider what people actually do, we can sometimes discern a difference between what they profess, and what they actually believe.
Tuesday, January 27, 2009
Thursday, December 04, 2008
A predisposition to believe?
In a recent article, Justin Barret argues that the reason belief in gods is so prevalent in human societies is that we have certain innate predispositions that tend to lead to a belief in supernatural agents.
This brought a critical response from philosopher A.C. Grayling, which unfortunately seemed to amount to little more than the ad hominem strategy of attacking Barret's faith position and funding, rather than the arguments themselves.
However, as Barrett subsequently points out, his arguments are not new and they don't come from Christians or Templeton Foundation funded researchers.
Barret cites Pascal Boyer's 2001 book 'Religion Explained' as one source and this reminded me that Grayling has never really understood the nuances of Boyer's position. In Grayling's collection of essays 'The Reason of Things', he mentions Boyer's arguments directly and criticises them, for failing to account for the following:
"Why, for example, have traditionally conceived deities had human characteristics of will, intention, memory and emotion, instead of being like (say) waterfalls, carrots or birds?"
Clearly Grayling either has not read or has not understood the chapters of 'Religion Explained' which deal with this precise point about what kind of entity turns out to be a suitable candidate for the role of deity.
This brought a critical response from philosopher A.C. Grayling, which unfortunately seemed to amount to little more than the ad hominem strategy of attacking Barret's faith position and funding, rather than the arguments themselves.
However, as Barrett subsequently points out, his arguments are not new and they don't come from Christians or Templeton Foundation funded researchers.
Barret cites Pascal Boyer's 2001 book 'Religion Explained' as one source and this reminded me that Grayling has never really understood the nuances of Boyer's position. In Grayling's collection of essays 'The Reason of Things', he mentions Boyer's arguments directly and criticises them, for failing to account for the following:
"Why, for example, have traditionally conceived deities had human characteristics of will, intention, memory and emotion, instead of being like (say) waterfalls, carrots or birds?"
Clearly Grayling either has not read or has not understood the chapters of 'Religion Explained' which deal with this precise point about what kind of entity turns out to be a suitable candidate for the role of deity.
Sunday, August 03, 2008
Transcendental Logic Part II
Friday, March 21, 2008
The Limits of Rationality
For the purposes of this blog post, I am defining rational thought as the process of deriving valid inferences from a set of premises.
As such it has a very limited domain within human affairs but makes a very important contribution for all that.
Sometimes people seem to argue that the supporters of secular liberal democracies should educate the children of religious adherents about the logical inconsistencies in religious beliefs in order to make the decline of religious fundamentalism more likely. Ironically though, this might ignore the evidence on what religious adherence entails and what benefits it might have.
Usually when humans attempt to compete directly with evolution in terms of creating artifacts that mimic the behaviour of biological mechanisms, evolution wins against our gadgets created by rational thought. Whilst we can make things that biology has not and perhaps could not, when we have tried to build things that walk across rough terrain unaided, or things that can recognise speech or images, our attempts so far have come a poor second. (Though we are doing a little better these days.)
When it comes to trying to solve some of the problems of life or engaging in creative activity that we consider worthwhile, it seems to me we must turn to non rational means. Some problems seem intractable when faced via reason. How to deal with loss and the knowledge of our own ultimate decline and demise perhaps. Other areas seem to positively benefit from the suspension of reason:
'Of course, you could be uncompromisingly rational and try whispering in your honey's ear: "Darling, you're the best combination of secondary sexual characteristics and mental processing that my fitness calculator has come up with so far." After you perform this pilot experiment and see how far you get, you may reconsider your approach. If you think that approach absurd to begin with, it is probably because you sincerely feel, and believe in, love.' Scott Atran
Perhaps evolution and culture have equipped us with ways of thinking that are non rational in terms of the strict definition I have used here, but that solve some practical problems better than rational thought does. Here is another example from Atran taken from his reply to Sam Harris after the first Beyond Belief conference:
"A research team that I co-directed in the Maya Lowlands for more than a decade — including psychologists, biologists, linguists, and anthropologists — found that only one of three human populations that live in the same environment practices agro-forestry in a sustainable manner (measured in terms of crop diversity, canopy cover, soil nutrients, etc., as reported in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA). We found the most reliable predictor of behavioral differences between the three groups (Itza' Maya, Q'eqchi' Maya, Ladino) to be their respective mental models of how humans, plants and animals interact in the rainforest (reported in Current Anthropology and The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute). And the best indication of a sustainable distribution of species for the forest was the mental model held by the men of one group (computed by factor analysis from individual responses) of which species the forest spirits desire most to protect (this is reliably different from what people themselves consider most worthy of protection, as reported in Psychological Review). " Scott Atran
Read the rest here.
As such it has a very limited domain within human affairs but makes a very important contribution for all that.
Sometimes people seem to argue that the supporters of secular liberal democracies should educate the children of religious adherents about the logical inconsistencies in religious beliefs in order to make the decline of religious fundamentalism more likely. Ironically though, this might ignore the evidence on what religious adherence entails and what benefits it might have.
Usually when humans attempt to compete directly with evolution in terms of creating artifacts that mimic the behaviour of biological mechanisms, evolution wins against our gadgets created by rational thought. Whilst we can make things that biology has not and perhaps could not, when we have tried to build things that walk across rough terrain unaided, or things that can recognise speech or images, our attempts so far have come a poor second. (Though we are doing a little better these days.)
When it comes to trying to solve some of the problems of life or engaging in creative activity that we consider worthwhile, it seems to me we must turn to non rational means. Some problems seem intractable when faced via reason. How to deal with loss and the knowledge of our own ultimate decline and demise perhaps. Other areas seem to positively benefit from the suspension of reason:
'Of course, you could be uncompromisingly rational and try whispering in your honey's ear: "Darling, you're the best combination of secondary sexual characteristics and mental processing that my fitness calculator has come up with so far." After you perform this pilot experiment and see how far you get, you may reconsider your approach. If you think that approach absurd to begin with, it is probably because you sincerely feel, and believe in, love.' Scott Atran
Perhaps evolution and culture have equipped us with ways of thinking that are non rational in terms of the strict definition I have used here, but that solve some practical problems better than rational thought does. Here is another example from Atran taken from his reply to Sam Harris after the first Beyond Belief conference:
"A research team that I co-directed in the Maya Lowlands for more than a decade — including psychologists, biologists, linguists, and anthropologists — found that only one of three human populations that live in the same environment practices agro-forestry in a sustainable manner (measured in terms of crop diversity, canopy cover, soil nutrients, etc., as reported in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA). We found the most reliable predictor of behavioral differences between the three groups (Itza' Maya, Q'eqchi' Maya, Ladino) to be their respective mental models of how humans, plants and animals interact in the rainforest (reported in Current Anthropology and The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute). And the best indication of a sustainable distribution of species for the forest was the mental model held by the men of one group (computed by factor analysis from individual responses) of which species the forest spirits desire most to protect (this is reliably different from what people themselves consider most worthy of protection, as reported in Psychological Review). " Scott Atran
Read the rest here.
Tuesday, December 18, 2007
A Manifesto for Non-Belief
Somebody recently pointed me in the direction of this website.
It contains 17 propositions and some quotes and links around the theme of questioning and challenging the way we think about the world.
I'd welcome any comments on this.
It contains 17 propositions and some quotes and links around the theme of questioning and challenging the way we think about the world.
I'd welcome any comments on this.
Wednesday, November 07, 2007
The Supernatural
Is this term an oxymoron? I suspect it is. Or at least, I think the worldview it describes is incoherent.
J.B.S. Haldane said;
“Now my own suspicion is that the universe is not only queerer than we suppose, but queerer than we can suppose.”
Which suggests to me the following hierarchy of possibilities:
1) The universe is queerer than we suppose.
2) The universe is queerer than we can suppose (Haldane)
3)The universe is queerer than we will ever be able to suppose
4) The universe is queerer than anything can suppose
5) The universe is queerer than anything will ever be able to suppose
So is 'supernatural' a contingent term, dependent on some specific time and epistemic horizon, or is it a statement of principle?
J.B.S. Haldane said;
“Now my own suspicion is that the universe is not only queerer than we suppose, but queerer than we can suppose.”
Which suggests to me the following hierarchy of possibilities:
1) The universe is queerer than we suppose.
2) The universe is queerer than we can suppose (Haldane)
3)The universe is queerer than we will ever be able to suppose
4) The universe is queerer than anything can suppose
5) The universe is queerer than anything will ever be able to suppose
So is 'supernatural' a contingent term, dependent on some specific time and epistemic horizon, or is it a statement of principle?
Sunday, September 30, 2007
An Open Mind
Recently, whilst debating on the Today message board, I have noticed a polarization between those who regard themselves as old school atheists and the so called New Atheists. The former are characterized as 'open minded' whilst the latter are seen as 'zealots'.
I am sceptical about the concept of open mindedness. It might be true that a psychometric index of flexibility of thought, or receptivity to new patterns of information might credibly be formulated and tested. I do wonder whether people can accurately assess this in the course of debate though. For example, are we swayed by irrelevant factors when deciding how open minded a contributor to a debate is? Factors like how much their position conflicts with ours and how confrontational their style of debate seems.
I wonder whether there is a direct correlation between the cognitive flexibility of a person and how open minded they seem to be. My initial thought is that there is not.
What do you think?
I am sceptical about the concept of open mindedness. It might be true that a psychometric index of flexibility of thought, or receptivity to new patterns of information might credibly be formulated and tested. I do wonder whether people can accurately assess this in the course of debate though. For example, are we swayed by irrelevant factors when deciding how open minded a contributor to a debate is? Factors like how much their position conflicts with ours and how confrontational their style of debate seems.
I wonder whether there is a direct correlation between the cognitive flexibility of a person and how open minded they seem to be. My initial thought is that there is not.
What do you think?
Friday, August 10, 2007
Meaning and Purpose
For some theists, the question of the so called 'meaning of life' is related to the question 'what is my purpose'. This is because their idea of meaning is bound up with the fulfillment of god's plan.
The word 'purpose' has two distinct uses:
1) The purpose of a corkscrew is to open bottles. It was specifically designed to fulfil this purpose.
2)My purpose in opening the fridge was to get some chilled water to drink.
Some theists think that in order to have purpose in a truly meaningful sense, there has to be an overarching type 1 purpose that we have been specifically created by god in order to fulfill. My contention is that we can get along fine with type 2 purposes.
So, if we were made to fulfil some plan or higher purpose of god, would that in itself guarantee that our lives would be 'meaningful' in the sense that most people would recognise? Surely it might depend on what god's plan actually is? After all, if it emerged that god created us specifically to be food for a highly intelligent scavenging intergalactic species that were due to pass through our solar system soon, I imagine that there would be muttering in the pews.
The trouble is, Christians don't seem to be able to give us much in the way of a meaningful description of god's purpose.
The word 'purpose' has two distinct uses:
1) The purpose of a corkscrew is to open bottles. It was specifically designed to fulfil this purpose.
2)My purpose in opening the fridge was to get some chilled water to drink.
Some theists think that in order to have purpose in a truly meaningful sense, there has to be an overarching type 1 purpose that we have been specifically created by god in order to fulfill. My contention is that we can get along fine with type 2 purposes.
So, if we were made to fulfil some plan or higher purpose of god, would that in itself guarantee that our lives would be 'meaningful' in the sense that most people would recognise? Surely it might depend on what god's plan actually is? After all, if it emerged that god created us specifically to be food for a highly intelligent scavenging intergalactic species that were due to pass through our solar system soon, I imagine that there would be muttering in the pews.
The trouble is, Christians don't seem to be able to give us much in the way of a meaningful description of god's purpose.
Thursday, June 28, 2007
Faith: Definition Creep
It seems that there are still plenty of people who want to argue that there is no difference between atheism and theism with regards to the requirement and nature of faith.
Sometimes this seems to be due to a naive conception of atheism that claims absolute knowledge of the non existence of god. There are very few atheists who actually think this way in my experience though. Another common reason is the collection of arguments regarding extreme scepticism and the foundations of knowledge. It is argued that we must have faith in, say, the Uniformity of Nature in order to live our lives. Well, an argument can be put for that but it seems to rest on an equivocation to me. Faith in this sense does not seem to bear much of a resemblance to the kind of faith required to believe six impossible things before breakfast.
Sometimes this seems to be due to a naive conception of atheism that claims absolute knowledge of the non existence of god. There are very few atheists who actually think this way in my experience though. Another common reason is the collection of arguments regarding extreme scepticism and the foundations of knowledge. It is argued that we must have faith in, say, the Uniformity of Nature in order to live our lives. Well, an argument can be put for that but it seems to rest on an equivocation to me. Faith in this sense does not seem to bear much of a resemblance to the kind of faith required to believe six impossible things before breakfast.
Sunday, May 27, 2007
The basis for lack of belief
I recently was asked these questions by Paul:
And you are an atheist because of the "evidence?"
You have evidence that the universe burst into existence due to some natural phenomena?
You have evidence that its delicately tuned laws of physics are a lucky roll of the dice because we are one of infinite universes?
You have evidence that life actually arose from simple chemistry?
You have evidence that a prokaryote has changed into a eukaryote, and you know the chemical pathways?
You have evidence that consciousness, will, emotion, and morality can be produced from complex chemistry?
You have evidence that Jesus didn't actually say what is claimed and rise from the dead?
And then he ended with this statement:
I think there are surely some presuppositions haunting your thinking.
Surely there must be presuppositions to thought. I don't see it as a haunting though. I do see that one presupposition is the notion of the burden of proof. A better phrase might be the burden of evidence. Some of these questions I can answer in the affirmative, others I regard as an attempt to shift the burden of evidence. I wonder if my assessment coincides with anyone else's.
And you are an atheist because of the "evidence?"
You have evidence that the universe burst into existence due to some natural phenomena?
You have evidence that its delicately tuned laws of physics are a lucky roll of the dice because we are one of infinite universes?
You have evidence that life actually arose from simple chemistry?
You have evidence that a prokaryote has changed into a eukaryote, and you know the chemical pathways?
You have evidence that consciousness, will, emotion, and morality can be produced from complex chemistry?
You have evidence that Jesus didn't actually say what is claimed and rise from the dead?
And then he ended with this statement:
I think there are surely some presuppositions haunting your thinking.
Surely there must be presuppositions to thought. I don't see it as a haunting though. I do see that one presupposition is the notion of the burden of proof. A better phrase might be the burden of evidence. Some of these questions I can answer in the affirmative, others I regard as an attempt to shift the burden of evidence. I wonder if my assessment coincides with anyone else's.
Monday, May 14, 2007
The Rationality of Faith
I recently read a paper: The Rationality of Science and the Rationality of Faith, Theodore J. Everett, Journal of Philosophy Vol. 98, No. 1. (Jan., 2001), pp. 19-42.
It made for interesting reading. The main points were:
1) That the prevailing orthodoxy that traditional 'non-scientific' beliefs derive from non rational causes is mistaken.
2)most scientists ought not to believe their own theories.
Everett draws a distinction between 'objective rationality' and 'subjective rationality'. He then argues that it is subjectively rational in most cases for people to believe in their local traditions since for a given individual, the probability that they know better than most other people around them is small. By a similar argument, scientists or intellectuals putting forward new theories ought to realise that the likelihood of them being correct in contradiction to what most of their peers think is also small.
There are some atheists that seem to me to have a simplified view of the nature of, and reasons for belief and faith which is counter productive and hampers dialogue. Some theists also evince a stereotyped view of atheists as being amoral and smug. people like Everett, Pascal Boyer (Religion Explained) and Michael Frayn (The Human Touch) are a few of the voices that might serve to counter this polarization.
It made for interesting reading. The main points were:
1) That the prevailing orthodoxy that traditional 'non-scientific' beliefs derive from non rational causes is mistaken.
2)most scientists ought not to believe their own theories.
Everett draws a distinction between 'objective rationality' and 'subjective rationality'. He then argues that it is subjectively rational in most cases for people to believe in their local traditions since for a given individual, the probability that they know better than most other people around them is small. By a similar argument, scientists or intellectuals putting forward new theories ought to realise that the likelihood of them being correct in contradiction to what most of their peers think is also small.
There are some atheists that seem to me to have a simplified view of the nature of, and reasons for belief and faith which is counter productive and hampers dialogue. Some theists also evince a stereotyped view of atheists as being amoral and smug. people like Everett, Pascal Boyer (Religion Explained) and Michael Frayn (The Human Touch) are a few of the voices that might serve to counter this polarization.
Thursday, March 15, 2007
Truth
What is truth? Recently in the comment sections of this blog it was put to me that truth is a function of language. This may well be right, I suspect that it is. On the other hand this might just put the problem of the nature of truth at one extra remove, since we can say truth is a function of language and then ask: what is language a function of?
If the correspondence theory of truth is mired in circularity because we have to use language itself to describe what the truth of a proposition could correspond to, what is the alternative?
If the correspondence theory of truth is mired in circularity because we have to use language itself to describe what the truth of a proposition could correspond to, what is the alternative?
Friday, February 09, 2007
Faith and Reason
I was wondering if anybody could shed light on what I regard as a puzzle. Do those who have faith have to arbitrarily stop reasoning beyond a certain point? In order to interpret what it is one has faith in, reason must be used but that same facility will also tell you that your faith is not based on sound evidence (by definition). So how is that delicate equilibrium maintained? Or is the situation, on closer inspection, no different to how things are for an agnostic like me?Some might want to argue that one needs faith in order to accept Reason without proof and that you can't prove the validity of Reason itself without circularity. However, rejection of Reason is self refuting, so I don't think one needs faith, in the ordinary sense of the word, to accept Reason on a rational basis without proof.
Of course, if your reason leads you to a position which you regard as compatible with your faith position there will be no risk of cognitive dissonance at the interface between faith and reason. But if, as I have, you come to the conclusion that there is no rational basis for belief in any of the religious truth claims, yet you still have faith, how does that work?
Of course, if your reason leads you to a position which you regard as compatible with your faith position there will be no risk of cognitive dissonance at the interface between faith and reason. But if, as I have, you come to the conclusion that there is no rational basis for belief in any of the religious truth claims, yet you still have faith, how does that work?
Friday, December 15, 2006
Science and Religion
For a long time I have thought that the main reason that science is compatible with religion is that people have a high tolerance to inconsistency. Living with sets of mutually contradictory beliefs may be the norm in fact.
For anybody who is interested in the relationship between science and religion I would reccomend the downloadable mpegs of a recent conference on this topic involving many of the usual suspects (Dawkins, Joan Roughgarden, Steven Weinberg, Lawrence Krauss, Sam Harris, Michael Shermer and others) which you can find here.
For anybody who is interested in the relationship between science and religion I would reccomend the downloadable mpegs of a recent conference on this topic involving many of the usual suspects (Dawkins, Joan Roughgarden, Steven Weinberg, Lawrence Krauss, Sam Harris, Michael Shermer and others) which you can find here.
Saturday, September 16, 2006
Transcendental Logic.
I came across this cute site recently. Have a go and see if you can spot any flaws in the proof.
Sunday, July 16, 2006
Quantum Ethics
Are moral values things that are part of the universe itself in the sense that they would exist even if all sentient lifeforms had ceased to exist? One of the pillars of the theist worldview is that some moral values express things that are objectively true. But wait a minute, haven't we all learned that you can't derive an 'ought' from an 'is' ? Yet people experience the world as if some things are objectively right or wrong. If this cannot be because of the way the world is, theists conclude that the guarantor of these objective moral truths must be God. There is a well known problem with this: it is the Euthyphro dilemma. Is something good because god commands it, or does God command it because it is good? If the former, then what if God had commanded otherwise? It makes morality seem arbitrary. If the latter, then 'good' already existed and God cannot be its guarantor.
So how would a secular account look? Does secularism entail moral relativism in the sense that what is 'right' or 'wrong' is just a matter of cultural preference or societal sanction? I think not. I think that evolution by natural selection has provided us with the ability to track certain aspects of the world. Part of our world is the social nexus. We have a theory of mind. We can predict what somebody else will do sometimes because we can imagine what it is like to be them. This has consequences in terms of which sets of behaviours will maximise survival. Go around arbitrarily killing and stealing and you won't last long enough to reproduce. So we are equipped with a set of 'ethical drivers' which profoundly influence our perception and emotions about our possible behaviours. There is no guarantor in the sky, but just as Noam Chomsky speaks of 'universal grammar' such that humans have a predisposition to develop language, I am postulating (I'm sure I'm not the first) a universal ethics. Does this analogy fit? Well different societies have different ethical codes, but there are some invariant properties. There are no societies where murdering your firstborn is considered 'good'. Similarly English and German are very different but they both have verbs, adjectives and nouns.
So in order to function within a viable ethics, moral values must have certain invariant principles and in this sense there is an objective component. If humans went extinct tomorrow, the scavengers and saprophytes would feast on our corpses without any moral qualms and in this sense morals are subjective on a species level.
So how would a secular account look? Does secularism entail moral relativism in the sense that what is 'right' or 'wrong' is just a matter of cultural preference or societal sanction? I think not. I think that evolution by natural selection has provided us with the ability to track certain aspects of the world. Part of our world is the social nexus. We have a theory of mind. We can predict what somebody else will do sometimes because we can imagine what it is like to be them. This has consequences in terms of which sets of behaviours will maximise survival. Go around arbitrarily killing and stealing and you won't last long enough to reproduce. So we are equipped with a set of 'ethical drivers' which profoundly influence our perception and emotions about our possible behaviours. There is no guarantor in the sky, but just as Noam Chomsky speaks of 'universal grammar' such that humans have a predisposition to develop language, I am postulating (I'm sure I'm not the first) a universal ethics. Does this analogy fit? Well different societies have different ethical codes, but there are some invariant properties. There are no societies where murdering your firstborn is considered 'good'. Similarly English and German are very different but they both have verbs, adjectives and nouns.
So in order to function within a viable ethics, moral values must have certain invariant principles and in this sense there is an objective component. If humans went extinct tomorrow, the scavengers and saprophytes would feast on our corpses without any moral qualms and in this sense morals are subjective on a species level.
Sunday, July 09, 2006
Evolution and the Soul
Pope Pius XII in his 1950 encyclical Humani Generis, recognised the following problem and it applies to the majority of Christians of all denominations who accept evolution. It is this: at what point in the continuum of the evolution of humans did God decide we should all get souls and why then? The standard christian defense is that we cannot know the mind of God. This catch all seems unsatisfactory though. Have any of you theological Ninjas out there got a patch for this bug?
Ideas are welcome.
Ideas are welcome.
Monday, June 12, 2006
Formal Proof of 'ought' implies 'can'
I have been looking into this problem since posting on ephphatha's blog philochristos.
I must admit I have found nothing satisfactory so far. Deontic logic seems beset with problems. Can anybody help?
I must admit I have found nothing satisfactory so far. Deontic logic seems beset with problems. Can anybody help?
Monday, May 01, 2006
Free Will
While I am getting to grips with the control interface I want to put forward one of the main difficulties that I see with the traditional Christian worldview. It is the Problem of Evil. I will state this briefly now.
If God is omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenificent, how can there be suffering in the world?
This topic has been dealt with at length by philosophers and theologians and is still debated on blogs and message boards to this day. What really makes me curious is this:
What is it that makes people find the argument that suffering is a result of us having free will convincing?
I know that all the predicates such as omnipotence have limitations such as avoidance of logical contradictions. It does not follow from this, however, that the world we see is the best of all possible worlds given those necessary parameters.
It just does not seem credible, whether you take this metaphorically or not, that God should create a universe bounded by the categories of time and matter in order for it to be a habitat for humans. Further why, foreseeing every move that the feckless, weak willed and covetous creatures would make, He nonetheless created them only to be outraged by their sin? The notion that He would then sacrifice part of Himself to Himself in order to atone for sins which are breaches of moral absolutes that He encoded into the universe in the first place is counter-intuitive. All this so that despite a lack of good evidence for His existence, we, as rational beings could have the free will to chose to have a relationship with Him via his sacrificed son? Why is the concept of atonement morally acceptable anyway? How does somebody else's sacrifice influence the moral status of what I have done? Nor does the suffering seem related in a simple way to free will and sin. Malaria, earthquakes and the like are morally indiscriminate, they kill innocents and guilty alike. The remark that we are all sinners after the 'fall' seems an outdated and morally abhorrent concept. Why did God not create us to enjoy eternal bliss, without the wish or predisposition to do evil? Would any loss of free will that this would entail be a bad thing? I think not.
So as a whole picture, the Christian solution to the Problem of Evil seems incoherent.
If God is omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenificent, how can there be suffering in the world?
This topic has been dealt with at length by philosophers and theologians and is still debated on blogs and message boards to this day. What really makes me curious is this:
What is it that makes people find the argument that suffering is a result of us having free will convincing?
I know that all the predicates such as omnipotence have limitations such as avoidance of logical contradictions. It does not follow from this, however, that the world we see is the best of all possible worlds given those necessary parameters.
It just does not seem credible, whether you take this metaphorically or not, that God should create a universe bounded by the categories of time and matter in order for it to be a habitat for humans. Further why, foreseeing every move that the feckless, weak willed and covetous creatures would make, He nonetheless created them only to be outraged by their sin? The notion that He would then sacrifice part of Himself to Himself in order to atone for sins which are breaches of moral absolutes that He encoded into the universe in the first place is counter-intuitive. All this so that despite a lack of good evidence for His existence, we, as rational beings could have the free will to chose to have a relationship with Him via his sacrificed son? Why is the concept of atonement morally acceptable anyway? How does somebody else's sacrifice influence the moral status of what I have done? Nor does the suffering seem related in a simple way to free will and sin. Malaria, earthquakes and the like are morally indiscriminate, they kill innocents and guilty alike. The remark that we are all sinners after the 'fall' seems an outdated and morally abhorrent concept. Why did God not create us to enjoy eternal bliss, without the wish or predisposition to do evil? Would any loss of free will that this would entail be a bad thing? I think not.
So as a whole picture, the Christian solution to the Problem of Evil seems incoherent.
Secular Thoughts
Secular Thoughts
Control of the interface for my own blogs is the first priority so I hope you will bear with me while I figure this out as I am a complete noob.
Control of the interface for my own blogs is the first priority so I hope you will bear with me while I figure this out as I am a complete noob.
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