tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26110280.post4898119357797876739..comments2023-06-20T14:43:46.933+01:00Comments on Secular Thoughts: The Modal Scope FallacyPsiomniachttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01102719882200943549noreply@blogger.comBlogger47125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26110280.post-73362843623093850552011-02-10T12:56:34.139+00:002011-02-10T12:56:34.139+00:00That's a shame Bx4 since I was not seeking a c...That's a shame Bx4 since I was not seeking a competitive debate, rather I was doing my best to understand your view, and failing. If you change your mind and want to try to sort it out you'll be most welcome.<br /><br /><i>I really wish you would stop misrepresenting what I say.</i><br />I was trying my best to understand, sorry. <br /><br /><i>My comment above was simply an agreement to:<br /><br /><br />your specific point:<br /><br />(a)p (premise):it is in fact raining at (x,y,z,t).<br /><br />(b) @p (premise: necessarily it is raining at (x,y,z,t)<br /><br /><br />which clearly has nothing to do with what follows your ' That's simple'</i><br />Well there doesn't seem to be anything in the above that warrants your agreement or not, so I naturally assumed you meant the substantive argument of which the above was a part. Sorry I got that wrong.<br /><br /><i>Strange then that in your 557 you neglect to mention Blackburn, or the horizontality of the ladder or his minimalist conclusion.</i><br />Not really, I thought you'd remembered that I've read Blackburn and I thought you'd get that I meant the ladder was horizontal because that was the point I was making. Why you think I was using it any other way is just baffling to me; I just don't understand why you think necessity or contingency had anything to do with the Ramsey's ladder part of my argument. I just thought I might get you to see that @p means necessarily p is true from seeing first that 'p is true' is equivalent to 'p'. Hence the Ramsey reference.<br /><br /><i>There seems to be a considerable amount of revisionism in play here.</i><br />There isn't and I think it is a shame that you would make such an accusation.<br /><br /><i>This was you quoting me rather than the reverse.</i><br />I'm afraid we've got very tangled here. You brought up something, I made my best attempt at an interpretation that I thought would be relevant, you responded by saying that wasn't the point you were making. Therefore I still can't see the relevance of your quote.<br /><br />I used Ramsey's ladder in a way I'll illustrate with brackets:<br /><br />@[p]==@[p is true] (by Ramsey's ladder.<br /><br />hence @p means necessarily p is true.<br />Seems clear to me.<br /><br /><i>However, as I said to you before my preference is for dianoetic rather than competitive debate. This is clearly degenerating into the latter.</i><br />I'm sure you don't mean to imply that I'm solely to blame for that :-)<br /><br /><i>So once again, adieu not au revoir.</i><br />That might be for the best. Although we have had some interesting debates I've concluded that we basically don't 'get' each other, and this leads to miscommunication which is inimical to progress or satisfactory resolution. I wish you well though, and as I said the door is open.Psiomniachttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01102719882200943549noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26110280.post-44833037278120994432011-02-10T02:00:22.493+00:002011-02-10T02:00:22.493+00:00psomniac:
'That's simple, I made the argu...psomniac:<br /><br /><b><i>'That's simple, I made the argument that @p means necessarily p, and that in turn this means that necessarily p is true, (not that it can be true or false), with two points about premises a few posts ago. You responded:<br /><br /><i>I am quite happy to go along with both. I'm not really clear why you would imagine I would do otherwise.</i></i></b><br /><br />I really wish you would stop misrepresenting what I say.<br /><br />My comment above was simply an agreement to:<br /><br /><b><i><br />your specific point:<br /><br />(a)p (premise):it is in fact raining at (x,y,z,t).<br /><br />(b) @p (premise: necessarily it is raining at (x,y,z,t)</i></b><br /><br /><br />which clearly has <b>nothing</b> to do with what follows your <i>' That's simple'</i><br /><br /><i>'Why? The quote from Blacburn you give supports my idea that to assert that p is true is equivalent to asserting p. The ladder is horizontal.'</i><br /><br />Strange then that in your 557 you neglect to mention Blackburn, or the horizontality of the ladder or his minimalist conclusion.<br />Instead presenting it as an upward, almost vertical, progession that supported a conclusion of the type Blackburn was satirising.<br /><br />There seems to be a considerable amount of revisionism in play here.<br /><br /><i> 'Then the original quote has no relevance to my argument, so I'm unclear as to why you brought it up.'</i><br /><br />The original quote began:<br /><br /><b>"I have just had a speed read ...your 557...</b><br /><br />This was you quoting me rather than the reverse.<br /><br />If it has 'no relevance to your argument' then your introduction of it is, to say the least, rather odd.<br /><br />However, as I said to you before my preference is for dianoetic rather than competitive debate. This is clearly degenerating into the latter.<br /><br />I only came on here because of your last post in hootoo. I see no point in continuing.<br /><br />So once again, adieu not au revoir.Bx4noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26110280.post-70711864800147948032011-02-09T23:27:56.434+00:002011-02-09T23:27:56.434+00:00I don't see why you think I have changed my po...<i>I don't see why you think I have changed my position.</i><br />That's simple, I made the argument that @p means necessarily p, and that in turn this means that necessarily p is true, (not that it can be true or false), with two points about premises a few posts ago. You responded:<br /><i>I am quite happy to go along with both. I'm not really clear why you would imagine I would do otherwise.</i><br /><br /><i>Asserting Ramsey's ladder assupporting your case is a bit odd.</i><br />Why? The quote from Blacburn you give supports my idea that to assert that p is true is equivalent to asserting p. The ladder is horizontal. My point is that if I say:<br />1) p<br /><br />then that is the same as saying<br /><br />2) p is true<br /><br />or<br /><br />3) it is true that p is true<br /><br />and so on.<br /><br /><i>Since I have never claimed this the point seems of little relevance. </i><br />Then the original quote has no relevance to my argument, so I'm unclear as to why you brought it up. Some propositions are necessarily true, we symbolise this by saying, for example @p. If we want to say a proposition, q for example, is necessarily false, we say @¬q. <br /><br /><i>The substantive point at issue as far as I was concerned was that the modality of a proposition was distinct from its truth-value.</i><br />If I say that necessarily it is raining(x,y,z,t), then I am qualifying the truth of that proposition, I agree. But all I'm doing is saying that not only is it true (it is the case that it is raining(x,y,z,t)), I'm qualifying that by saying that it is not possible for it to be false.<br /><br /><i>But clearly by my quoting SEP above I don't agree to that. </i><br />I don't understand your point here. I agree that 'necessarily' is used to qualify the truth of a judgement. In the case of @p it qualifies 'p is true' to become 'necessarily p is true'. If you wanted to qualify the judgement that something is false you'd say something like @¬q. <br /><br /><i>Nor given modal axiom T</i><br />Again, I can't see your point.<br /><br />Consider axiom T:<br /><br />@p->p<br /><br />Now you say that the truth-value of any arbitrary proposition p is independent of its modality. Well, in a sense that's true. Suppose p is true, it might also be necessarily true or not. Suppose p is false, it might be necessarily false or not.<br /><br />Let's again suppose that p = it is raining at (x,y,z,t). What does axiom T (or M) say? It says that if, necessarily it is raining at (x,y,z,t) then it is raining at (x,y,z,t). That would still be so, even if it turns out that it is not the case that it is raining at (x,y,z,t). We would just conclude that the antecedent is also false.<br /><br />What I'm trying to get you to agree is the <b>meaning</b> of asserting p and asserting @p.<br /><br />Maybe the point you haven't taken on board is that the meaning is distinct from the truth value. So:<br /><br />a) it is raining at (x,y,z,t)<br /><br />means the same as saying<br /><br />b) it is true that it is raining at (x,y,z,t)<br /><br /><i>regardless</i> of whether it is true that it is raining at (x,y,z,t).Psiomniachttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01102719882200943549noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26110280.post-73867175702961071872011-02-09T10:33:04.271+00:002011-02-09T10:33:04.271+00:00Corrigendum
@p->p (wherein p the truth-value o...Corrigendum<br /><br /><i>@p->p (wherein p the truth-value of p the modality @)</i><br /><br />should read<br /><br /><i>@p->p (wherein p the truth-value of p is <b>independent</b> ofthe modality @)</i>Bx4noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26110280.post-10798505275562249102011-02-08T21:51:57.198+00:002011-02-08T21:51:57.198+00:00This is a reply to your:
http://psiomniac.blogspo...This is a reply to your:<br /><br />http://psiomniac.blogspot.com/2010/09/modal-scope-fallacy.html?showComment=1296862149252#c9082794691043198787<br /><br />In your 557 you explicitly say:<br /><br />(1'@p means necessarily p, which is short for 'necessarily p is the case, ie p is true, recall Ramsay's Ladder<br /><br />Asserting Ramsey's ladder assupporting your case is a bit odd. It was first enunciated by Simon Blackburn in 'Ruling Passions'(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998, pp. 78, 295-6)<br /><br />A.W. Moore in 'Quasi-realism and Relativism (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. LXV, No. 1, July 2002,150-156) ) decribes it thus:<br /><br />This is a series of propositions each of which, bar the first, looks as if it is on a higher level than its predecessor (in the sense of being substantially<br />about its predecessor) though in fact they all have the same content; as Blackburm puts it, ‘Ramsey’s ladder is horizontal'<br /><br />or as Blackburn puts it himself:<br /><br />'We can see why this is so if we put it in terms of what we can call Ramsey’s ladder. This takes us from p to it is true that p, to it is really true that p, to it is really a fact that it is true that p, and if we like to it is really a fact about the independent order of things ordained by objective Platonic normative structures with which we resonate in harmony that it is true that p...Ramsey’s ladder is horizontal. The view from the top is just the same as the view from the bottom, and the view is p.' <br />(Review of Thomas Nagel, The Last Word)<br /><br />http://consc.net/pics/expressivism.html<br /><br />So in the end as far as its originator, Blackburn, is concerned the Ramsey Ladder reduces to no more than position p. Which seems closer to my stance on PrF than yours which seems to hold that the additional state 'contingent' C(PrF) or, alternatively, the additional state 'necessary N(PrF), where 'r' stands for 'has the referent' <br /><br />'But the IEP quote doesn't mean that the same p can be necessarily true or false.'<br /><br />Since I have never claimed this the point seems of little relevance. <br /><br />The substantive point at issue as far as I was concerned was that the <i>modality</i> of a proposition was distinct from its truth-value.<br />.<br /><br />As I say later in my 580 from which you take the above quote<br /><br /><i>'A modal is an expression (like ‘necessarily’ or ‘possibly’) that is used to <b>qualify</b> the truth of a judgement'</i> [my emphasis].<br />('Modal Logic, SEP)<br /><br />'All I was trying to get you to agree in #581 on that thread was that if we say:<br /><br />1) @p<br /><br />then we mean that necessarily p, which is equivalent to saying that necessarily p is true.'<br /><br /><br />But clearly by my quoting SEP above I don't agree to that. Nor given modal axiom T<br /><br />@p->p (wherein p the truth-value of p the modality @)<br /><br />am I clear why you would think that.<br /><br />'If you now agree this, as you seem to, we can move on.'<br /><br />I don't see why you think I have changed my position. Surely, it is you who should agree that the <i>truth-value</i> of any <i>arbitrary</i> proposition p is independent of its <i>modality</i>?Bx4noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26110280.post-42355117896589650572011-02-07T16:31:44.592+00:002011-02-07T16:31:44.592+00:00One refinement I need to make is to say that a nec...One refinement I need to make is to say that a necessary proposition is a proposition which is true under every <i>possible</i> valuation.<br /><br />It might help to consider the following:<br /><br />1) Kc(p) => p<br /><br />where '=>' is material implication.<br /><br />If Kc(p)= T and p = F then the above is false. If this is not a possible valuation of 1) then this proposition is necessary and we can say;<br /><br />@(Kc(p) => p)<br /><br />In fact in defining Kc(p) we have to take Kc(p) => p as an axiom, in other words by the definition of 'knowledge' it is not possible to know something that is not the case.Psiomniachttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01102719882200943549noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26110280.post-38853190321841142882011-02-07T15:08:24.075+00:002011-02-07T15:08:24.075+00:00Sorry, but I don't understand your view at all...Sorry, but I don't understand your view at all. I have given a definition of 'contingent' as you asked. <br /><br />You have not confirmed whether you now agree on the meaning of @p. Please could you address this.<br /><br />A few comments ago I asked you to explain your view, please could you give your objection to the idea of contingent propositions clearly, or at least an exposition of your view. <br /><br />Your objections to my definition of 'contingent' can be fixed. Replace '==' with '='; I accept that '==' was unnecessary, and remove 'logical' to give:<br /><br />P is contingent on F. It is not necessary.<br /><br />An example of a necessary proposition is Q, where:<br /><br />Q=Pv¬P<br /><br />I don't see why this is problematic. A necessary proposition is true under all valuations. Above, Q is true for all possible truth values of P.<br /><br />I hope that clarifies.Psiomniachttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01102719882200943549noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26110280.post-16900359224449678822011-02-07T14:37:18.799+00:002011-02-07T14:37:18.799+00:00'Contingent' just means not necessarily tr...'Contingent' just means not necessarily true nor necessarily false doesn't it?'<br /><br />I don't see that this gets us anywhere since all you have done is defined one problematic state 'contingent' in terms of the other problematic state 'necessary'<br /><br />Moreover, this does not explain why you hold that either state is relevant to PrF where 'r' is the relationship 'has as a referent'.<br /><br />P is contingent on F. It is not logically necessary.<br /><br />This seems have the same problem as the above except insofar as you have added the qualifier 'logical' to the modality 'necessary' but not to the modality contigent.<br /><br />This seems a much more limited claim. Is the antithesis of 'logically necessary', contigent or logically contingent?<br /><br />If the latter, in what sense is logically contingent different from contingent?<br /><br />'An example of a necessary proposition is Q, where:<br /><br />Q==Pv¬P'<br /><br />I'm not quite clear as to what work '==' is doing here and what the definition of a contingent proposition would be. Perhaps you would clarify?Bx4noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26110280.post-13411411938603301052011-02-07T14:36:26.175+00:002011-02-07T14:36:26.175+00:00This comment has been removed by the author.Bx4https://www.blogger.com/profile/12151053449609373847noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26110280.post-10879889724937736672011-02-07T12:16:33.174+00:002011-02-07T12:16:33.174+00:00'Contingent' just means not necessarily tr...'Contingent' just means not necessarily true nor necessarily false doesn't it?<br /><br />P is contingent on F. It is not logically necessary.<br /><br />An example of a necessary proposition is Q, where:<br /><br />Q==Pv¬PPsiomniachttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01102719882200943549noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26110280.post-90305359976349632702011-02-06T18:46:43.080+00:002011-02-06T18:46:43.080+00:00Perhaps you could begin by defining what you mean ...Perhaps you could begin by defining what you mean by contingent?<br /><br />I don't understand the difficulty you have with my argument but I'll try again.<br /><br />Assume B-theoretic spacetime continuum with the fact F(Rain at x,y,z,t) and with the referring proposition P('It is raining at time x,y,z,t').<br /><br />Then what feature of the above warrants the labelling of P as 'contigent' or, alternatively, as 'necessary'?Bx4noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26110280.post-47090807382658611722011-02-06T16:57:00.872+00:002011-02-06T16:57:00.872+00:00Ok, so I don't understand your view on this. I...Ok, so I don't understand your view on this. I don't see why a proposition cannot be contingent just because it has F as its referent, even if F is not contingent or necessary. Perhaps you could explain this.Psiomniachttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01102719882200943549noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26110280.post-10274855771630953032011-02-06T15:29:58.158+00:002011-02-06T15:29:58.158+00:00double posting again probles with the word veifica...double posting again probles with the word veification 'feature. ignore first of pairBx4noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26110280.post-72638693374863311492011-02-06T15:22:10.670+00:002011-02-06T15:22:10.670+00:00'I don't really understand your view on th...'I don't really understand your view on this. Perhaps your thinking on the ontological status of 'possibilia' leads you to conclude that the actual is necessary. If so, I don't agree.'<br /><br />It was nothing to do with 'pssibilia' which seen abit of a movable feast rather a much narrower polnt about how a proposition like P('it is raining at x,y,z.t') which has a referent the fact F(Rain at x,y,z,t) can be contigent.<br /><br />This does not presuppose that a failure to demonstate that the actual can be contigent, validates the notion of the actual as necessary. <br /><br />Quite the opposite since I find the notion of contingent facts and necessary facts not just incoherent but absurd.Bx4noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26110280.post-13530492096527187912011-02-06T15:17:14.504+00:002011-02-06T15:17:14.504+00:00This comment has been removed by the author.Bx4https://www.blogger.com/profile/12151053449609373847noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26110280.post-56259130537047822542011-02-06T15:16:28.332+00:002011-02-06T15:16:28.332+00:00'I don't really understand your view on th...'I don't really understand your view on this. Perhaps your thinking on the ontological status of 'possibilia' leads you to conclude that the actual is necessary. If so, I don't agree.'<br /><br />I was a much narrower polnt about how a proposition like P('it is raining at x,y,z.t') which has a referent the fact F(Rain at x,y,z,t) is contigent.<br /><br />This does not presuppose that a failure to demonstate that the actual is can be contigentof the actual, validates the notion of the actual as necessary. <br /><br />Quite the opposite since I find the notion of contingent facts and necessary facts incoherent not to say absolutely daftBx4noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26110280.post-43522671874632388592011-02-06T13:19:43.595+00:002011-02-06T13:19:43.595+00:00I don't really understand your view on this. P...I don't really understand your view on this. Perhaps your thinking on the ontological status of 'possibilia' leads you to conclude that the actual is necessary. If so, I don't agree.Psiomniachttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01102719882200943549noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26110280.post-32435761645355700772011-02-06T10:51:10.009+00:002011-02-06T10:51:10.009+00:00Sorry for delay. Want to read environs of 557 befo...Sorry for delay. Want to read environs of 557 before I reply and I have not had time to do so yet.<br /><br />One point though on IEP extract:<br /><br />'Many philosophers divide the class of propositions into two mutually exclusive and exhaustive subclasses: namely, propositions that are contingent'<br /><br />Note 'many' not 'all'. I'm with those who don't. Can't see how propositions with referent facts can be contingent.Bx4noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26110280.post-90827946910431987872011-02-04T23:29:09.252+00:002011-02-04T23:29:09.252+00:00I am quite happy to go along with both. I'm no...<i>I am quite happy to go along with both. I'm not really clear why you would imagine I would do otherwise.</i><br />Specifically, it's because you said this:<br /><br />"<i>I have just had a speed read of of your 557. The crux of your argument seems to be that Ramsey's Ladder /entails/ that if necessarily P then necessarily P is true.<br /><br />Of course it doesn't as you can see if you substitute ¬P for P which would make ¬P necessarily true and P necessarily false.<br /><br />Moreover:<br /><br />'Many philosophers divide the class of propositions into two mutually exclusive and exhaustive subclasses: namely, propositions that are contingent (that is, those that are neither necessarily-true nor necessarily-false) and those that are noncontingent (that is, those that are necessarily-true or necessarily-false).'<br />('Truth', Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy)<br /><br />Which seems to contradict your claim that a necessary proposition /must/ be a necessarily-true</i><br /><br />But the IEP quote doesn't mean that the <b>same</b> p can be necessarily true or false, it means that there is a set of propositions, some of which are necessarily true and some necessarily false. So I accept that you can have @¬q which is taken to mean that, necessarily q is false.<br /><br />All I was trying to get you to agree in #581 on that thread was that if we say:<br /><br />1) @p<br /><br />then we mean that necessarily p, which is equivalent to saying that necessarily p is true.<br /><br />If you now agree this, as you seem to, we can move on.Psiomniachttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01102719882200943549noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26110280.post-8739234572978600832011-02-04T22:39:28.319+00:002011-02-04T22:39:28.319+00:00Specfically a difference as to whether F can be co...<i>Specfically a difference as to whether F can be contigent or not.</i><br />What do you think? What does it mean to say that what is actual possibly isn't? It is easy to suppose that p is contingent because we can imagine that F is different than what is actual without logical contradiction. But to suppose F itself can be contingent seems to lead to a contradiction, namely that it is possible that actual states of affairs do not obtain. Maybe I'll have to think some more on that.Psiomniachttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01102719882200943549noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26110280.post-71203623718910028412011-02-04T20:21:37.766+00:002011-02-04T20:21:37.766+00:00As to your specific point:
(a)p (premise):it is i...As to your specific point:<br /><br />(a)p (premise):it is in fact raining at (x,y,z,t). <br /><br />(b) @p (premise: necessarily it is raining at (x,y,z,t)<br /><br />I am quite happy to go along with both. I'm not really clear why you would imagine I would do otherwise.<br /><br />'I take that as a given in the form of the law of the excluded middle.'<br /><br />I think it was stephenlawrence in the other place who didn't take it as a given though, as I recall, he was arguing erroneously from the LNC rather than the LEMBx4https://www.blogger.com/profile/12151053449609373847noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26110280.post-82323927071232516162011-02-04T20:20:15.840+00:002011-02-04T20:20:15.840+00:00This comment has been removed by the author.Bx4https://www.blogger.com/profile/12151053449609373847noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26110280.post-90172395185079667342011-02-04T19:40:31.967+00:002011-02-04T19:40:31.967+00:00Perhaps the nub of our disagreement centres not so...Perhaps the nub of our disagreement centres not so much on the proposition P but rather its referent, F, the relevant state of affairs (F) in the world, that is:<br /><br />F(it is raining at x,y,z,t) is the referent of P('it is raining at x,y,z,t')<br /><br />Specfically a difference as to whether F can be contigent or not.<br /><br />Note: the '' round P are not meant indicate a specific utterance of P but are simply intended as a way of distinguishing the proposition P from the fact F.Bx4https://www.blogger.com/profile/12151053449609373847noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26110280.post-71263329341330098642011-02-04T13:11:40.477+00:002011-02-04T13:11:40.477+00:00I don't have any problem with any of that so f...I don't have any problem with any of that so far. I think the reason we ground to a halt last time was that we couldn't agree on what @p means even after we translate '@' in exactly the way you suggest above. <br /><br />We could try again, let's suppose p stands for something like 'it is raining at (x,y,z,t)'.<br /><br />Then suppose I say:<br /><br />1) p (premise).<br /><br />then I'm taking as my premise that it is in fact raining at (x,y,z,t). What I'm not doing is saying that either it is or it isn't raining at (x,y,z,t). <br /><br />Now suppose I had said:<br /><br />1) @p (premise).<br /><br />then I'm taking as my premise that <i>necessarily</i> it is raining at (x,y,z,t). What I'm not doing is saying that necessarily either it is or it isn't raining at (x,y,z,t) since I take that as a given in the form of the law of the excluded middle.<br /><br />Now, quibbles aside, unless we can agree something like the above, I can't see how to make progress.Psiomniachttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01102719882200943549noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-26110280.post-42310841129697252482011-02-04T10:20:32.187+00:002011-02-04T10:20:32.187+00:00Oops! appear to have posted twice. Please disregar...Oops! appear to have posted twice. Please disregard the first post.Bx4noreply@blogger.com